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l. INTRODUCTION 
May an administrative law judge exclude counsel for contemptu-
ous conduct, disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest or other reasons, 
or suspend or disbar counsel for past misconduct? This question illus-
trates the professional responsibility issues that can arise in the adjudi-
cative proceedings of administrative agencies. 1 
This article addresses some of these issues, by examining the ad-
mission of attorneys to practice before agencies, the standards of con-
duct required of attorneys when they practice before agencies, and the 
enforcement of these standards. The article then briefly considers the 
same topics of admission, standards, and enforcement with regard to 
parties and nonlawyer representatives. The focus of the article turns 
next to the standards of conduct of administrative law judges and the 
enforcement of these standards. The conclusion offers answers to the 
question posed above and others raised during the article. 
II. ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS TO PRACTICE BEFORE AGENCIES 
A. State Agencies - State Supreme Courts Control 
State supreme courts possess exclusive authority to issue licenses 
for the practice of law, even in states where the standards of attorney 
conduct are adopted by the legislature. 2 An attorney's license entitles 
the holder to practice in any tribunal of the state. In states which cer-
tify attorneys as specialists in designated areas of the law, the certifica-
tion program demonstrates ability, but does not affect the right of desig-
nated or non-designated attorneys to practice in any area of the law.3 
Under the principle of separation of powers, neither the legislature 
nor the executive branch of state government may encroach on the ex-
clusive domain of the state supreme court to control the admission of 
attorneys. A statute or agency rule establishing special requirements to 
be met by attorneys in order to practice before an agency would there-
I. See generally Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 173 (1983-84); Best, Shortcomings of Administrative Agency Lawyer Discipline, 
31 EMORY L. j. 535 (1982); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 3.6.2 (1986). 
2. On legislative adoption of standards of attorney conduct, see infra, notes 22-24, 45 and 
accompanying text. On state courts' control over admission to practice, see WoLFRAM, supra note 
I,§ 15.2.1. 
3. WoLFRAM, supra note I, § 5.4. 
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fore be unconstitutional. The Florida Bar v. Moses 4 notes that the 
legislature may not control the admission of attorneys to practice before 
administrative agencies, but the case allows the legislature to set stan-
dards for the admission of nonlawyers to represent clients before 
agencies. 
If the power to enforce standards of conduct belonged exclusively 
to those who control admission to practice, administrative law judges 
(ALJ) in state agencies would be powerless to control the conduct of 
practitioners. ALJs, however, do have some power to control, despite 
their lack of power to admit. 11 
B. Federal Agencies - Congress Controls but May Delegate to 
Agencies 
The situation at the federal level is quite different from that in the 
states. The federal courts handle the admission of attorneys on a decen-
tralized basis. Each federal court, pursuant to its own rules of practice, 
admits attorneys to its own bar, generally on a routine basis for any 
attorney licensed by the highest court of the state. 6 No federal court can 
license an attorney to practice before another federal courf - or before 
a federal agency. Congress has enacted statutes that establish the basic 
standards for admission to practice before federal agencies. 
In the past, statutes allowed various federal agencies to establish 
their own bars. These bars were governed by standards for admission 
and conduct prescribed by each agency within the framework of its own 
enabling act. 8 Some cases decided under these circumstances suggest 
that the ALJ's power to enforce standards of conduct flows from the 
agency's power to admit attorneys to practice.9 These cases imply that 
4. 380 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1980) (based on language in state constitution authorizing legislature 
to confer quasi-judicial functions upon administrative agencies). For a more traditional view, 
where the state constitution contained no such provision, see Idaho State Bar Ass'n. v. Idaho Pub. 
Util. Comm'n., 102 Idaho 672,637 P.2d 1168 (1981) (agency's order permitting nonprofit organi-
zations and small businesses to be represented by nonlawyers in hearings held invalid). See fur-
ther discussion infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 15-17, 117-32 and accompanying text. 
6. WoLFRAM, supra note I, § 15.2.4. The author observes, in § 5.4, that some federal dis-
trict courts require attorneys to pass the trial advocacy certification before admission to practice. 
7. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 n.4 (1985) (federal court of appeals has no 
authority to suspend attorney from practicing in district courts in the circuit). 
8. The legislative history of the Agency Practice Act, infra note I 0, shows that by 1965, 
many federal agencies had already repealed their special admission requirements. 1965-2 U.S. 
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4170. See also cases cited infra note 9. 
9. E.g., Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. 
Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), affd. on other grounds 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied 
356 U.S. 927 (1958); Camp v. Herzog, I 04 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952). 
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without the power to admit, agencies may not have the power to en-
force standards of conduct. 
The agencies' power to control the admission of attorneys was vir-
tually eliminated by the Agency Practice Act of 1965 (Act).10 Only the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may now impose its own stan-
dards for admission of attorneys to practice.11 The Act confers, upon 
anyone licensed to practice in the highest court of any state, automatic 
admission to practice before any other federal agency .12 The Act defines 
"agency" to mean those covered by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). 13 The Act confers similar automatic admission privileges upon 
certified public accountants (CPA)/4 but allows agencies to impose 
their own admission requirements on any person who is neither an at-
torney nor a CPA. 
The Act includes two important disclaimers. First, the Act "does 
not ... authorize or limit the discipline, including disbarment, of indi-
viduals who appear in a representative capacity before an agency."u 
The statute thus indicates congressional willingness to allow agencies to 
exercise the power to discipline, even though they no longer have the 
power to deny admission to members of state bars. The Act does not 
confer the power to discipline, but does not conflict with other statutes 
that do so. 
Second, the Act "does not . . . authorize an individual who is a 
former employee of an agency to represent a person before an agency 
when the representation is prohibited by statute or regulation."16 This 
provision apparently authorizes an agency to disqualify counsel from 
appearing in a specific matter, if the appearance would violate statutes 
or regulations which limit the activities of individuals who have passed 
through the "revolving door" between governmental and private prac-
tice/7 even if the revolving door statutes or regulations do not explicitly 
provide for disqualification of counsel. 
Thus, although the typical federal agency no longer has the power 
10. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1982). 
11. 5 U.S.C. § 500(e) (1982). The enabling act of the Patent and Trademark Office, pre-
served by the Agency Practice Act, authorizes the PTO to prescribe regulations requiring all 
attorneys seeking admission to its bar to demonstrate that they have good moral character and 
reputation, "and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other 
persons valuable service, advice, and assistance .... " 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1982). 
12. 5 U.S.C. § 500(a)(2), (b) (1982). 
13. 5 U.S.C. § 500(a)(l) (1982). 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (1982). 
15. 5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1982). 
16. 5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(3) (1982). 
17. The basic limitation on practice before a federal agency by its former employees is 18 
U.S C. § 203 (1982). 
224 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
to admit, it does have the power to disqualify in order to prevent viola-
tion of revolving door statutes or regulations and may exercise discipli-
nary powers if authorized by other statutes. In the federal system and 
in the states, the power to enforce standards of conduct can be exercised 
by agencies that do not have the power to admit. 
III. STANDARDS oF ATTORNEY CoNDUCT 
Attorneys who represent parties in administrative adjudication are 
governed by the general standards of conduct that apply to the practice 
of law in the jurisdiction. Other statutes and rules may impose addi-
tional standards. 
A. Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 
The most influential compilations of general standards are the 
Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) in 1970, and the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, adopted in 1983 to supersede the Code as ABA policy. The Code 
and the Model Rules set forth numerous standards of conduct to govern 
an attorney who appears before a tribunal. 18 In addition, the Code and 
the Model Rules require an attorney to comply with the tribunal's own 
rules19 and, to some extent, with other law.20 
18. See, e.g., ABA Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter Code] DR 5-102 (with-
drawal as counsel when lawyer becomes witness), DR 6-101(A) (competent representation), DR 
7-102 (representing a client within the bounds of the law), DR7-103 (performing the duty of 
public prosecutor or other government lawyer), DR 7-106(B), (C) (conduct before a tribunal), 
DR 7-107 (trial publicity), DR 7-108 (communication with or investigation of jurors), DR 7-109 
(contact with witnesses), DR7-110(B) (ex parte communications), DR 9-101(C) (claiming to have 
improper influence), EC 2-29 (appointment by court). 
See also, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [hereinafter Model Rules] Rules 1.1 
(competence), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 3.5 
impartiality and decorum of tribunal), 3.6 (trial publicity), 3.7 (lawyer as witness), 3.8 (special 
responsibilities of a prosecutor), 6.2 (accepting appointments), 8.4(e) (claiming to have improper 
influence). For a recent ABA interpretation of an attorney's duty when faced with a perjurious 
client, see ABA Formal Opinion 87-353 (1987). 
19. E.g., Code DR 2-110 (withdrawal), DR 7-106(A) (standing rule or ruling of tribunal); 
Model Rules 1.16(c) (order not to withdraw), 3.4(c) (rules of a tribunal). 
20. E.g., Code DR 1-1 02(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), DR 2-1 06(A) 
(illegal or clearly excessive fee), DR4-1 01 (C)(2) (reveal confidences or secrets when required by 
law or court order), DR 7-101(A)(I) (use reasonably available means permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules), DR 7-102(A)(3) (conceal that which he is required by law to reveal), DR7-
102(A)(7), (8) (illegal conduct); Model Rules 1.2(d) (criminal conduct), 3.4(b) (offer inducement 
that is prohibited by law), 3.5(a) (influence by means prohibited by law), 3.5(b) (communicate ex 
parte except as permitted by law), 8.4(b) (criminal act), 8.4(f) (violation of applicable rules of 
judicial conduct or other law). 
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1. Controlling or persuasive 
Most state supreme courts have adopted their own versions of the 
Code or Model Rules as rules of court, enforceable through the disci-
plinary process.21 Distinctive variations from this pattern are found in 
the two most populous states. 
California lawyers are governed by a series of statutes, including 
one that authorizes the State Bar, with Supreme Court approval, to 
formulate rules of professional conduct having the force of law.22 The 
California Rules of Professional Conduct23 are shorter than the ABA 
Code, but the combined effect of the California Rules and that state's 
statutes amounts to a system of regulation comparable to that found in 
other states. 
Standards of conduct for New York lawyers are prescribed by stat-
ute in the Judiciary Law.24 The Code of Professional Responsibility 
has not been promulgated by statute or by court rule, but has been 
adopted by the New York State Bar Association. 211 Although the Code 
does not have the force of law, it is given persuasive effect by the New 
York courts when they interpret provisions of the Judiciary Law.26 
Neither the Code nor the Model Rules have been adopted as gen-
eral regulations for the federal courts, but the local rules of practice of 
federal courts generally include provisions incorporating, by reference, 
the standards of professional conduct adopted by the state's highest 
court. 27 
2. Practice before agencies 
The Code and the Model Rules apply to practice before adminis-
trative agencies in adjudicative matters. The Code expresses this policy 
by defining "tribunal" to include all courts and other adjudicatory bod-
ies.28 Accordingly, an attorney appearing before an ALJ or an adminis-
trative agency in an adjudicative matter is governed by all the standards 
that apply when the attorney appears in a court - and by additional 
standards, if imposed by statute or agency rule. 
21. WoLFRAM, supra note 1, §§ 2.6.3, 2.6.4. 
22. CALIF. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 6076 (West ed. 1974). See WoLFRAM, supra note 1, § 
2.6.5. 
23. The Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California are set forth in CALI-
FORNIA RULES OF CoURT STATE (West 1 987). 
24. NEw YoRK CoNSOLIDATED LAW, jUDICIARY LAw § 90 (McKinney 1983). 
25. The Code is set forth as an Appendix to the juDICIARY LAw (McKinney 1 975). 
26. E.g., In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 591, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1984). 
27. WoLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.3. 
28. Code, "Definitions" (6). See also, DR 7-107(H), dealing specifically with publicity dur-
ing the pendency of an administrative proceeding. 
226 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct achieve the same result 
by a different structure. The Model Rules make frequent use of the 
term "tribunal," but without any definition. Rule 3. 9 contains special 
provisions regarding one type of tribunal - a legislative or administra-
tive tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding.29 An attorney who ap-
pears before this type of tribunal is governed by only designated por-
tions of the Model Rules. This rule implies that the full coverage of the 
Model Rules applies to other tribunals, consisting of courts and admin-
istrative agencies in adjudicative proceedings. 
B. judicially Created Standards 
The courts have prescribed numerous other standards, many of 
which pertain only to practice before the courts. These other standards 
are relevant to the present article for three reasons. First, administra-
tive adjudication frequently leads to the courtroom, in proceedings seek-
ing review or enforcement of agency action. Accordingly, attorneys who 
anticipate appearing in administrative proceedings and in any related 
judicial proceedings must bear in mind the standards of conduct that 
the courts will require. Second, some of the judicial standards are inco-
porated by reference in statutes governing procedure before administra-
tive agencies. Finally, judicial standards provide essential analogies for 
dealing with the conduct of attorneys before administrative agencies. 
1. General rules of procedure 
State supreme courts generally have authority to promulgate state-
wide rules of civil, appellate, criminal, and other types of procedure.30 
Again, California and New York require special mention. In each of 
these states, the legislature exercises primary responsibility for promul-
29. Model Rule 3.9. For some recent intepretations of the Model Rules in the context of 
administrative proceedings, see, e.g., In rePetition for Review of Opinion 583, 107 N.J. 230, 526 
A.2d 692 (1987) (ex parte communications allowed between deputy attorney general and agency 
head during some stages of administrative proceeding- interpreting Rule 3.5); In re Petition for 
Review of Opinion 569, 103 N.J. 325, 511 A.2d 119 (1986) (6-month disqualification of former 
state employee from practicing before agency to avoid appearance of impropriety); ABA Informal 
Opinion 84-1508 (1984) (lawyer employed in nonlawyer capacity by state agency); ABA Informal 
Opinion 85-352 (lawyer may advise client to report position on tax return - limitations). 
30. See Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleadings, Practice, or Procedure, 
110 A.L.R. 22, supplemented 158 A.L.R. 705. Recent cases include Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 
160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d, 491, 77 A.L.R.2d 390 (1959), appeal dismissed and cert. denied 
361 U.S. 374 (1960) (maximum fee schedule could be characterized as procedural rather than 
substantive, and therefore within rulemaking power of court); R.E.W. Constr. Co. v. District 
Court, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965) (Idaho Supreme Court has power to promulgate rules 
of procedure for all courts); Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976) (Tennessee Supreme 
Court rules may not be challenged in any lower court). 
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gating rules of practice, but the highest level of the judiciary may adopt 
additional rules, not inconsistent with statute.31 The Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act incorporates the rules of civil procedure by 
reference,32 to govern discovery in administrative adjudication. 
At the federal level, the Rules Enabling Act33 authorizes the Su-
preme Court to adopt rules for all federal courts, to become effective 
ninety days after presentation to Congress. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, promulgated under this authority, regulate civil practice in 
the federal courts and have served as a model for many state codes of 
civil procedure. 3" Federal Civil Procedure Rules 11 and 37 have 
achieved special prominence in recent years. These rules require the 
court to impose sanctions against attorneys who sign frivolous pleadings 
or engage in abuses of the discovery process. 311 
2. Local rules of practice 
Each state court has power to adopt its own local rules of prac-
tice. 36 This power may be implied by the constitutional grant of the 
judicial power to each court, or may be expressly conferred by statute 
or supreme court rule. 
Local rules may not abrogate standards of conduct established by 
statewide rules, but may impose reasonable additional standards, such 
as dress codes.37 The power to impose discipline against attorneys for 
misconduct is generally reserved to the state supreme court and its dis-
ciplinary agencies. All courts, however, may take measures to assure 
31. CAL. CoNST. art. VI, § 6; N.Y. CoNST. art. VI, § 30. 
32. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act § 4-210(a) (1981), in 14 Unif. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter 1981 
MSAPA]. 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). 
34. See McKusick, State Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for Recogni-
tion, 36 ME. L. REv. 253 (1984); Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 
ME. L. REV. 243 (1984). 
35. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LITIGATION, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND 
OTHER PowERS (1986); Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Proce-
dural Sanctions, 14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 433 (1986); Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under 
Amended Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499 (1986). See 
also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 does not require same proce-
dures as for contempt, because money sanction is not contempt); Adduano v. World Hockey 
Ass'n., 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court lacks authority to impose Rule 11 sanction for 
settlement agreement that was neither submitted to the court nor incorporated in the court's dis-
missal order). 
36. WOLFRAM, supra note I, § 2.2.2. 
37. E.g., Friedman v. District Court, 611 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1980) (coat and tie); Sandstrom v. 
State, 336 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1976) (fabric tie, not string tie); but see Jensen v. Superior Court, 154 
Cal. App. 3d 533, 201 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court may not compel lawyer to 
remove turban). 
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the orderly and fair conduct of proceedings. One example is the exclu-
sion of attorneys who engage in contemptuous conduct or who have 
serious conflicts of interest.38 If no statewide rules or statutes authorize 
the lower courts to take such measures, courts may provide for them in 
local rules, or may impose them in specific cases without prior promul-
gation as rules. 39 
Federal statutes authorize each federal court to adopt its own rules 
of practice.40 Even if these statutes had not been enacted, the federal 
courts could arguably claim that the Article III grant of the judicial 
power implies the ancillary power to adopt rules of practice. In their 
locally adopted rules of practice, the federal courts generally incorpo-
rate, by reference, the standards of professional conduct adopted by the 
state court of the locality!1 Each federal court, in its rules, may make 
its own changes or additions to these standards. 
3. Case law 
Recent years have seen an explosion of litigation involving motions 
to disqualify counsel from appearing before courts,42 and a few cases 
involving disqualification of counsel from appearing before administra-
tive agencies!3 Many court rulings on disqualification place heavy reli-
ance on the Code or Model Rules, although the tribunal's power to 
disqualify attorneys and regulate conduct before its own bar is not de-
rived from, nor controlled by, the Code or the Model Rules. 
The law on the disqualification of attorneys is derived, essentially, 
from the decisions of courts, which either interpret local rules of court 
or impose disqualification based on the duty of each court to assure 
basic fairness. Courts also have the power and the duty to assure the 
fairness of proceedings by taking other necessary measures, even though 
these measures are not prescribed by statutes or rules!4 
C. Statutory Standards 
Federal and state statutes prescribe standards of attorney conduct, 
in addition to those imposed by the Code, Model Rules, or other judi-
cial action. Statutory standards may pose special issues under the state 
and federal constitutions. 
38. WoLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.2.4. 
39. E.g., Pantori, Inc., v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. App.1980). 
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1654, 2071 (1982). 
41. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.6.3. 
42. WoLFRAM, supra note 1, § 7.1.7. 
43. Infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
44. WoLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.2.1. 
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1. State constitutional limitations 
Some state constitutions vest exclusive power in the supreme court 
to regulate the conduct of attorneys, while other states confer this 
power primarily upon the legislature, allowing the highest judicial level 
to perform a secondary role in prescribing standards of conduct within 
the statutory framework.n 
In states where the constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction in the 
supreme court, statutes and agency rules pertaining to the conduct of 
attorneys must avoid encroachment on the domain of the supreme 
court. In Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Bar Association v. 
Thornburgh, 48 a statute prohibited former public officials or employees 
from practicing before their former agencies within one year after leav-
ing the agencies. The Pennsylvania court held the statute unconstitu-
tional, as "an impermissible intrusion by the legislature into an area 
reserved by the Constitution to the Supreme Court and one where the 
Supreme Court has acted to regulate the conduct of attorneys.""7 
In other states, where the legislature exercises primary authority 
to prescribe standards of attorney conduct, the issue of legislative en-
croachment on the supreme court's domain cannot arise. In these states, 
however, other challenges may be asserted. For example, if a statute 
purports to authorize state administrative agencies to exercise judicial 
power, the statute will be held unconstitutional. Under the principle of 
separation of powers, only the courts may exercise judicial powers. Ad-
ministrative agencies may be vested, by statute, with quasi-judicial, but 
not with judicial powers. The problem, of course, is to determine what 
types of power should be regarded as "judicial" in this context. Some 
cases addressing this issue are discussed later, in the context of statutory 
attempts to authorize agencies to enforce standards of attorney 
conduct."8 
2. Federal constitutional limitations 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other entity of 
the federal government has the exclusive constitutional power to regu-
late the federal practice of law. Nor may the state courts regulate the 
federal practice of law, in view of the Supremacy Clause,"9 although 
federal courts have voluntarily adopted many state rules governing the 
45. Supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
46. 702 Pa. Commw. 88, 434 A.2d 1327 (1981), affd. 498 Pa. 589, 450 A.2d 613 (1982), 
followed in Kury v. Commonwealth, 62 Pa. Commw. 174, 435 A.2d 940 (1981). 
47. 434 A.2d at 1331. 
48. Infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text. 
49. U.S. CaNST. art. VI, § 2. 
230 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
professional conduct of attorneys. Since no governmental entity has ex-
clusive power to regulate the practice of federal law, federal statutes 
and agency rules cannot be challenged effectively on the grounds of 
encroachment. 
Federal statutes are, however, subject to invalidation if they pur-
port to confer judicial power on a nonjudicial entity. The rationale is 
that the constitution vests the judicial power exclusively in the courts 
established under Article IIP0 
3. General statutes 
Attorneys are governed by a massive array of federal and state 
statutes. Many of these statutes apply to attorneys engaged in adminis-
trative as well as other types of practice, including those on such diverse 
topics as fraud,111 perjury,112 money laundering,113 forfeiture,114 and the 
"revolving door" between governmental and private practice. 1111 Addi-
tional control is imposed by the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 
which prohibits counsel from making ex parte communications to ad-
ministrative law judges.116 The 1981 Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act contains a similar prohibition.117 
Special standards apply to counsel who represent governmental 
units in administrative adjudication as well as in other proceedings. 
These standards are found in numerous statutes and rules regulating 
the conduct of government employees (including attorneys), with special 
emphasis on avoiding conflicts of interest.118 
4. Enabling acts 
Standards of attorney conduct are set forth in the enabling acts of 
the PTO and the Treasury Department. The PTO's enabling act au-
thorizes it to exclude or suspend attorneys, either generally or from any 
50. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
51. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud). 
52. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (false statements). 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. IV 1986). 
54. 21 u.s.c. § 853 (1982). 
55. 18 u.s.c. § 203 (1982). 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l )(A) (1982). 
57. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-213(c). 
58. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) (disqualification of former officers and employees; disquali-
fication of partners of current officers and employees); 5 C.F.R. § 737.1 to .33 (1987) (Office of 
Personnel Management regulations on post-employment conflict of interest); 5 C.F.R. § 738.101 
to .313 (1987) (Office of Personnel Management regulations on Office of Government Ethics); 5 
C.F.R. § 1304.4601 to .4608 (1987) (Office of Management and Budget regulations on post-
employment conflict of interest); 28 C.F.R. § 0.39 (1987) (Office of Professional Responsibility in 
U.S. Department of Justice). 
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particular case, if they are incompetent, disreputable, guilty of gross 
misconduct, fail to comply with PTO regulations, or deceive, mislead, 
or threaten any applicant, prosective applicant, or other person with 
business before the Office.119 The enabling act of the Treasury Depart-
ment sets forth the grounds on which the Secretary can suspend or dis-
bar a representative in terms similar to those found in the PTO's ena-
bling act. 60 
A significant feature of the PTO and Treasury statutes is that 
they control the conduct of attorneys, not only during proceedings 
before the agency, but more broadly in representing or dealing with 
any person who has business pending before the agency. In authorizing 
agencies to control attorneys in situations other than proceedings before 
the agencies, the statutes raise serious issues of validity and policy.61 
Arguably, an agency encroaches on the domain of the state supreme 
court when attempting to regulate the conduct of an attorney in any 
setting other than an appearance before the agency. 
Other agencies claim to derive the power to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys from less explicit provisions in their enabling acts, which con-
fer general power to adopt rules and regulations to carry out the agen-
cies' statutory missions.62 The question arises whether these broad 
59. 35 U.S.C. § 32 (1982). 
60. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1982). 
61. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
62. For example, the following agency rules provide for the exclusion of attorneys (the rele-
vant statutory authority cited in each rule is indicated parenthetically after each rule): 12 C.F.R. § 
269b.442(g) (1987) (Federal Reserve Board in bank labor relations matters, citing 12 U.S.C. § 
248, on enumerated powers of Board - relevance is not clear); 12 C.F.R. §§ 512.5(b)(3), 512.6 
(1987) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1464- general rulemaking 
power); 16 C.F.R. § 1025.42(b) (1987) (Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2064, 2069, 2076, 1194, 45 - relevance is not clear); 17 C.F.R. § 11.7(c)(2) (1987) (Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n, citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 4aU), 12a(S) - general rulemaking power); 24 
C.F.R. §§ 1720.80(b)(6), 3282.152(g) (1987) (Department of Housing & Urban Development, 
citing 15 U.S.C. § 1718, 42 U.S.C. § 5424- general rulemaking power); 29 C.F.R. § 102.35(f) 
(1987) (National Labor Relations Board, citing 29 U.S.C. § 156- general rulemaking power); 
29 C.F.R. § 417.6U) (1987) (Department of Labor, citing 29 U.S.C. § 481- general rulemaking 
power); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.66(f) (1987) (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, citing 29 
U.S.C. § 661(g), which authorizes the Commission "to make such rules as are necessary for the 
orderly transaction of its proceedings"); 33 C.F.R. § 148.267(d) (1986) (Coast Guard, citing 33 
U.S.C. § 1504(a), (b) - general rulemaking power. 
Agency rules on the suspension or disbarment of attorneys include: 7 C.F.R. § 1.26(b)(2) 
(1987) (Department of Agriculture, citing 5 U.S.C. § 301, which authorizes the head of an execu-
tive department or military department to "prescribe regulations for the government of his depart-
ment, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the cus-
tody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property"); 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (1987) (Board 
of Immigration Appeals, subject to approval of Attorney General, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103 - gen-
eral rulemaking power, and 8 U.S.C. § 1362 - allowing parties to be represented by counsel 
"authorized to practice" before the agency - these rules were enforced in Koden v. Department 
of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977), see infra text accompanying notes 64-65); 13 C.F.R. §§ 
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grants permit agencies to control attorneys only in proceedings before 
the agencies, or whether the statutes imply congressional intent to au-
thorize broader controls.63 
Koden v. Department of justice6"' upheld the power of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) to suspend an attorney for 
deceiving a client and employing a runner, although this misconduct 
did not occur in the presence of the agency. The INS rules prohibiting 
this conduct were based on a statute which authorized the Attorney 
General to "establish such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for 
carrying out his authority" under the enabling act.611 
The court upheld the power of the INS to impose sanctions for 
conduct occurring outside its presence, noting that courts often exercise 
their contempt power to punish misconduct occurring outside their 
presence. The court did not address the possibility that the imposition 
of sanctions for conduct occurring outside the presence of the tribunal 
may be a type of 'judicial" power, which may not be conferred by 
statute upon any nonjudicial entity.66 
D. Agency Standards 
If a valid enabling act authorizes an agency to adopt standards of 
attorney conduct, the agency may clearly use rulemaking as the means 
of exercising its power. Whether the agency may prescribe standards by 
101.8-7, 110.4 (1987) (Small Business Administration, citing 15 U.S.C. § 634 - general 
rulemaking power); 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(d) (1987) (Federal Trade Comm'n, citing 15 U.S.C. § 46 
-general rulemaking power); 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1987) (Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 
citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 77sss, 78w, 79t, BOa-37, BOb-11 - general rulemaking power); 29 
C.F.R. § 1 02.44(b) (1987) (National Labor Relations Board, citing 29 U.S.C. § 156 - general 
rulemaking power); 32 C.F.R. § 719.142 (1987) (Navy Judge Advocate General, citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 301 - see supra in this note, citation following 7 C.F.R. § 1.26(b)(2), Department of Agricul-
ture); 49 C.F.R. § 1103.5 (1986) (Interstate Commerce Comm'n, citing 49 U.S.C. § 10321 -
general rulemaking power - these rules were enforced in Polydoroff v. I.C.C., 773 F.2d 372 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) see infra text accompanying note 130). 
63. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
64. 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977). 
65. 564 F.2d at 233 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1362 (1976)). 
66. The statute in Kaden did not expressly authorize the regulation of conduct outside the 
agency. If the statute had done so, and if a court deemed such regulation to be a judicial function, 
a court would have held the statute invalid, under the principle of separation of powers. Since the 
statute did not expressly authorize such regulation, a court could have refused to imply it, using 
the technique of interpreting a statute narrowly so as to preserve its validity. See, e.g., National 
Cable Television Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 
(1958); Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under a narrow interpretation of the 
statute, the agency's attempt to discipline an attorney for conduct occurring outside its presence 
would have been held invalid, as beyond the authority conferred by statute. A similar result was 
reached in Adduano v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court lacks 
authority to impose Rule 11 sanction for settlement agreement that was neither submitted to the 
court nor incorporated in the court's dismissal order). 
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decisions in individual cases, without prior rulemaking, is questionable. 
In those states where administrative law judges are organized in a 
"central panel," the chief judge of the panel may be authorized to pro-
mulgate rules regulating practice before ALJs of the panel, including 
standards of attorney conduct. 
1. Agency rules 
Pursuant to its enabling act, the PTO has adopted and enforced its 
own rules of conduct, which have withstood challenge in the courts.67 
The Secretary of the Treasury, implementing the power conferred by 
that Department's enabling act, has promulgated Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) regulations, known as Circular 10, which establish stan-
dards of conduct by attorneys appearing before the IRS.68 Other federal 
agencies have relied on the less explicit grants of power in their respec-
tive enabling acts as the basis for adopting rules governing the conduct 
of attorneys.69 
2. Agency case law 
An agency's attempt to impose standards of attorney conduct by 
decisions in specific cases, without prior rulemaking, can be challenged 
on a number of grounds. First, enabling acts generally authorize agen-
cies to adopt rules to carry out their statutory missions, implying that 
rulemaking is an essential part of the process required by statute.70 Sec-
ond, standard-setting without prior rules arguably violates the require-
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act, that each agency adopt and 
publish rules describing its procedures.71 Third, standards established 
67. See Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987), discussed infra text 
accompanying note 131. 
68. 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 to .33 (1987). 
69. The statutes and corresponding rules of selected agencies are cited supra note 62. 
70. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 663 P.2d 570 (Ct. App. 1982) (psychotropic 
drug treatment of involuntary patient in state hospital); Balsam v. Department of Health & Reha-
bilitative Services, 452 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (moratorium on processing of appli-
cations for certificates of need); Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 257, 478 
A.2d 742 (1984) (method of assessing tax on TV /radio stations, based on share of local audience); 
Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1985) (interpretation of statute that 
requires recipient of extended unemployment benefits to engage in "systematic and sustained effort 
to obtain work"). While the above state cases tend to emphasize the legislative intent that agencies 
should develop policy by rulemaking, the federal cases (compiled infra note 72) tend to emphasize 
the need for fairness. The two lines of cases can be integrated by the argument that the statutory 
grant of authority must be interpreted in a manner likely to produce a fair result, since the legisla-
ture presumably intended fairness. Rulemaking is the procedure most likely to produce fairness; 
therefore, an agency's failure to use rulemaking violates legislative intent. 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(A-E) (1982); accord, 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 2-104. 
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without prior rulemaking could be deemed fundamentally unfair, under 
the doctrine that fairness requires rulemaking in some situations.72 
Despite these concerns, cases have upheld the power of agencies, 
in limited circumstances, to define and enforce standards in specific 
cases without prior rulemaking. Camp v. Herzog 73 allowed a federal 
agency, without rulemaking, to exclude an attorney for contemptuous 
conduct or for conflict of interest based on prior employment by the 
agency. The court held, however, that an agency cannot discipline at-
torneys, by suspension or disbarment, unless the agency has first 
promulgated rules. A similar result was reached by the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals in Brown v. District of Columbia Board of 
Zoning Appeals/"' upholding the power of an agency to disqualify 
counsel for conflict of interest, without prior rulemaking. 711 
If an agency has adopted rules of attorney conduct, and applies 
these rules in a specific case in a manner that indicates an apparent 
change in policy, the specific decision may be challenged on the grounds 
that the agency should have adopted its new policy by new rulemaking, 
not by adjudication.76 Similar criticism was aimed at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) decision in the Carter and Johnson 
case.77 
72. Some federal cases have required rulemaking as the procedure for the development of 
agency policy, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade 
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 999 (1982). Other cases of compa-
rable importance have allowed agencies to create new policy without rulemaking, e.g. Securities & 
Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 
U.S. 759 (1969). See generally 2 K. C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:26 (2d ed. 
1979). According to Florida case law, if an agency wishes to develop new policy through adjudica-
tion, the "incipient" policy must be placed in issue during the adjudicative hearing. McDonald v. 
Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So.2d 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981 ). 
73. 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952). 
74. 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 1980). 
75. The Herzog and Brawn cases will be discussed at length later, in connection with agen-
cies' powers to enforce their standards; infra notes 117 and 124 and accompanying text. 
76. For the proposition that an agency is bound by its own rules unless it promulgates new 
rules (or a higher authority intervenes), see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nader v. 
Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973). The 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § S-116(c)(8)(ii), 
provides for judicial relief from "agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with a rule 
of the agency." A similar but not identical result is included in Section of Administrative Law, 
American Bar Association, A Restatement of the Scope-of-Review Doctrine, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
235 (1986), which proposes to provide judicial relief from agency action that "violates limitations 
imposed by ... an agency rule having the force of law." /d. § (b)(1)(C), discussed in Levin, 
Scope-ofReview Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 
239, 248-49 (1986). 
77. In re Carter and Johnson, 22 S.E.C. Docket 292, Securities Act Release No. 17597 
(1981), discussed in numerous commentaries, including Cox, supra note I; Best, supra note 1; 
Kaplan, Some Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation, 56 NoTRE DAME L. RE:v. 
873, 878-82 (1981). 
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That decision, interpreting the SEC's Rule 2(e)78 innovatively, 
held that attorneys would be subject to discipline under that rule for 
failing to try hard enough to prevent their clients from filing misleading 
documents with the SEC. In the interests of fairness, the SEC excused 
attorneys Carter and Johnson from sanctions for their past violations of 
this newly-announced standard. By relieving the respondents from 
sanctions, the SEC precluded judicial review of the decision,79 but also 
deprived the decision of any precedential effect.80 
3. Rules of central panels of AL]s 
In states that have organized their administrative law judges in 
"central panel" systems,81 the chief ALJs of these central panels may 
adopt rules of practice that include standards of conduct to govern at-
torneys. A pending draft of model rules for all central panel states au-
thorizes the ALJ to impose sanctions against a party or representative 
who fails to appear at any scheduled proceeding, or who unreasonably 
fails to comply with any order of an ALJ or with any requirements of 
the rules. 82 
E. Professional Guidelines and Practices 
This survey of standards of attorney conduct ends with a brief 
mention of professional guidelines and practices. These standards, 
while not directly enforceable, may enter into discretionary decisions on 
issues of attorney conduct. 
78. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1987). 
79. A party who has suffered no injury lacks standing to seek judicial review of agency 
action; see B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVt: LAW§ 8.11 (2d ed. 1984). 
80. An agency cannot effectively establish a precedent by an order in an adjudicative proceed-
ing, unless the order applies to the party in that proceeding. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 
394 U.S. 759 (1969), discussed in SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, § 4.16. 
81. On the state central panel systems in general, see M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE CEN-
TRAL PANt:l. Svsn:M FOR ADMINISTRATIVt: LAW jUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STAn:s (1983). 
The 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, §§ 4-301, provides for a central panel, but offers alternatives 
as to whether or not its use is mandatory. /d. § 4-202(a) [bracketed language]. For a critical 
comment on the MSAPA's failure to make the central panel mandatory, see Harves, The 1981 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: The Impact on Central Panel States, 6 W. NEw 
ENG. L. REv. 661 (1984). On proposed legislation to create a central panel in the federal govern-
ment, see Symposia, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. Rt:v. 587 (1984); 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 693 (1983-84). 
82. Model Administrative Procedure Rules for Central Panel Agencies § 12.4 [draft ap-
proved August 8, 1987 by National Conference of Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Adminis-
tration Division, American Bar Association] (on file at B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law). 
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1. Nonbinding portions of Code and Model Rules 
The Code of Professional Responsibility consists of enforceable 
Disciplinary Rules and nonenforceable Ethical Considerations (EC).83 
In states that have adopted the Code, the ECs constitute a body of non-
binding advice to attorneys. In New York, where the Code has not been 
given the force of law at all, the entire Code is a body of influential but 
nonbinding advice from the State Bar Association.84 The Model Rules 
do not contain any ECs, but the comments following each rule provide 
varying amounts of explanation and advice. 811 
2. Federal Ethical Considerations 
The Federal Bar Association has adopted Federal Ethical Consid-
erations (FEC) for the guidance of attorneys employed by the federal 
government.86 The FECs deal with such issues as confidentiality, con-
flicts of interest, and identifying the client to whom the government 
attorney owes loyalty. 
3. Practices of bar and tribunal 
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to com-
ply with "known customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a partic-
ular tribunal" unless the lawyer gives timely notice to opposing counsel 
of the intent not to comply.87 The Model Rules omit this provision, 
with the comment that it is too vague to be enforceable.88 Although the 
Code provision on this point may indeed be unenforceable through the 
disciplinary process, the provision serves as a reminder that bars and 
tribunals often develop customs of courtesy or practice, which may vary 
considerably from one bar or tribunal to another. For example, lawyers 
may be quite willing to rely on a telephone conversation or a hand-
shake to signify waiver of a filing deadline in some bars, while written 
consent will be expected in others. 
Attorneys who practice before administrative agencies are likely to 
be influenced by the rules of practice in the courts, whether or not these 
rules are incorporated into the agencies' rules. Motion practice before 
an Administrative Law Judge, for example, is likely to proceed in sub-
83. Code, supra note 18, Preliminary Statement. 
84. Supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
85. Model Rules, supra note 18, Scope, 11 1. 
86. 20 FED. BAR NEWS 363 (1973). 
87. Code, supra note 18, DR 7-106(C)(5). 
88. Model Rules, supra note 18, Comment to Rule 3.4, Model Code Comparison, 11 5. 
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stantially the same manner as in a court, because the attorneys and the 
ALJ will be familiar with this practice. 
Finally, attorneys and ALJs are likely to look for analogies in the 
rules of court when faced with problems not covered in the agencies' 
own rules. The search for analogies is especially significant if ALJ s or 
agencies experience the need to prescribe and enforce standards of at-
torney conduct, but find no clear guidance in their enabling acts or 
rules. 
IV. ENFORCING STANDARDS OF ATTORNEY CoNDUCT 
The courts have traditionally enforced standards of attorney con-
duct. A central issue in this article is the extent to which Administrative 
Law Judges and agencies may undertake the enforcement of standards. 
A. Court Enforcement 
In recent years, judicial enforcement of standards of attorney con-
duct has focused on disciplinary proceedings under the Code or Model 
Rules. Courts have other means of enforcing standards, however, in-
cluding disqualification of counsel, contempt and other sanctions, re-
versing administrative decisions which result from ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and imposing civil liability against the attorney in favor of 
the client or another person. Each of these judicial enforcement mecha-
nisms requires brief examination for two reasons. First, to the extent 
an ALJ lacks the power to enforce standards of attorney conduct, the 
party seeking enforcement must resort to the courts. Second, the en-
forcement measures available to courts may provide analogies or con-
trasts to corresponding measures at the administrative level. 
1. Disciplinary proceedings under Code or Model Rules 
The only enforcement mechanism contemplated by the Code and 
the Model Rules is the disciplinary process.89 Neither the Code nor the 
Model Rules specifies which sanction should be imposed for which of-
fense. Rather, the type and severity of the sanction are left to the dis-
cretion of the highest court of the jurisdiction, which has final authority 
in attorney disciplinary matters (subject to review on federal constitu-
tional grounds). 
An attorney found guilty of misconduct may be disciplined by rep-
rimand or by disbarment or suspension from practice before all tribu-
nals of the state. Any state in which the attorney is licensed to practice 
89. Code, supra note 18, Preliminary Statement; Model Rules, supra note 18, Scope, 11 5. 
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may impose sanctions. There is no distinction as to whether the viola-
tion was committed before a court or an administrative tribunal,90 
whether this is a state or federal tribunal,91 or whether this tribunal is 
located inside or outside the state where sanctions are imposed.92 Fur-
ther, since the Code and the Model Rules require an attorney to com-
ply with rules of the tribunal, disciplinary processes under the Code or 
Model Rules can enforce the administrative agency's own standards as 
rules of the tribunal. The converse is not true; an agency cannot enforce 
standards that are contained in the Code or the Model Rules unless 
these standards are first adopted as rules of the agency. 
2. Disqualification of counsel 
The Code and the Model Rules provide for sanctions after mis-
conduct, but provide no mechanisms for preventing attorneys from com-
mitting misconduct. The courts, in the exercise of their powers to as-
sure the fairness of their own proceedings, entertain motions to 
disqualify counsel and make frequent references to the Code and the 
Model Rules as sources of the applicable standards.93 
If a court has jurisdiction to review the actions of an administra-
tive agency, the court is apparently empowered to entertain motions on 
ancillary matters, such as the disqualification of counsel, and may do so 
at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings in accordance with the 
principles that generally govern the review of nonfinal agency action.9 ' 
If the ALJ or agency is also authorized to disqualify counsel, a party 
may be required to exhaust this administrative remedy before asking 
the court to order disqualification of counsel.96 
90. E.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Miller, 310 Md. 163, 528 A.2d 481 
(1987) (federal appellate court's review of ICC decision to discipline lawyer was held not "final 
adjudication by judicial tribunal;" therefore, it was not conclusive proof of misconduct for state bar 
purposes - implying that the misconduct before the ICC, if proved, would be grounds for state 
discipline); In re Hutchinson, 518 A.2d 995 (D.C. 1986) (attorney discipline imposed by D.C. 
court for lawyer's untruthfulness before SEC). 
91. /d. 
92. /d.; Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 8.5. 
93. Supra notes 42-43. 
94. E.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1 980) (federal court disqualified 
law firm from appearing in a later stage of proceeding before FTC); Kadish v. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (declaratory suit by law firm seeking 
authority to represent plaintiff in subpoena enforcement matter - court disqualified individual 
lawyer but not law firm). 
95. Infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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3. Contempt and other sanctions 
The prevailing party in an administrative proceeding may seek a 
court order, enforceable through the contempt power of the court, to 
compel the losing party to comply with the agency's order.96 This rem-
edy is available for the enforcement of interlocutory as well as final 
orders; for example, subpoenas and discovery orders are generally en-
forceable through the court's contempt power.97 Accordingly, if an at-
torney refuses to comply with the order of an ALJ on a matter of pro-
fessional conduct, an appropriate movant may ask a court to compel 
compliance.98 The respondent attorney will, of course, have an oppor-
tunity to explain why the court should not order compliance. 
If the court orders compliance, a further question is whether the 
court should impose any sanction for the attorney's failure to comply 
with the ALJ's order in the first place. Some statutes provide for civil 
penalties in such situations, although courts may be reluctant to impose 
them. 99 If the attorney's explanation to the court is frivolous, the attor-
ney risks sanctions under Civil Procedure Rule 11 or its equivalent. 100 
The agency may, in turn, be ordered to pay a private party's attorney 
fees and costs if the agency took an unjustified position that led to un-
necessary litigation. 101 
96. E.g., Youst v. Longo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 50, 215 Cal. Rptr. 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), 
modified on other grounds, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 729 P.2d 728, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1987). The 1981 
MSAPA, supra note 32, includes general provisions on judicial enforcement of agency action, §§ 
5-201 to 5-205. On federal law, see generally ScHWARTZ, supra note 79, § 9.15. 
97. ScHWARTZ, supra note 79, § 3.10. See Note, The Argument for Agency Self-Enforce-
ment of Discovery Orders, 83 CoLUM. L. RF.V. 215 (1983). 
98. The motion should be made by the aggrieved party, not by the Administrative Law 
Judge. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
99. E.g., Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (appropriate method of challenging valid-
ity of IRS summons is to disobey - statute provides penalties for noncompliance, but respondent 
will not suffer these penalties if refusal is based on reasonable grounds, even though court over-
rules respondent's objections and orders compliance); Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 
(5th Cir. 1971) (court stayed statutory penalty, although court found support in the record for 
FTC's contention that respondent had delayed compliance in bad faith). Cf St. Regis Paper Co. v. 
United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) (Court enforced civil penalty nearly three years after respon-
dent's failure to comply with FTC subpoena). 
100. Supra note 35. 
101. The basic federal statute is the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 
III 1985). Recent interpretations include United States v. Kemper Money Market Fund, Inc., 781 
F.2d 1268 (7th Cir. 1986) (under the combination of Equal Access to Justice Act and Rule '57, 
attorney fees and expenses can be awarded against the United States); Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 
1324 (9th Cir. 1987) see infra, text accompanying notes 190-91 (attorney fees awarded under 
EAJA because of Social Security Administration's actions under the Bellman review program). 
Many states have enacted similar statutes. Recent state cases include Rosen v. State Bd. of 
Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984) (court has discretion to award attorney fees --
relevant factors include extent to which litigants have been involved in prior administrative pro-
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4. judicial relief for ineffective assistance of counsel 
Ramirez-Durazo v. l.N.S. 102 held that a party is entitled to judi-
cial relief upon demonstrating a denial of due process resulting from 
ineffective assistance of counsel during a deportation hearing. This case 
is a rare discussion of judicial relief for a party whose attorney violated 
professional standards in an administrative hearing. 
5. Civil liability to client or others 
Courts may indirectly enforce attorney standards of conduct by 
holding attorneys civilly liable to their former clients or to other parties 
who suffered prejudice from the attorneys' misconduct. The preambles 
to the Code and the Model Rules assert that these documents are not 
intended to establish the grounds for civil liability. 103 Courts generally 
agree that violation of the Code or Model Rules is not negligence per 
se, but may be taken into account in a negligence suit against the 
attorney .104 
If counsel for a private party violates professional standards in ad-
ministrative adjudication, and this violation also constitutes malpractice, 
the client and other victims can hold the attorney civilly liable.1011 
Counsel for an agency is generally absolutely immune from civil liabil-
ity, as is a prosecutor or judge/06 but counsel may be subject to adverse 
ceedings, cost thereof, nature of judicial review, and its cost); Moore v. California Unemployment 
Ins. Appeals Bd. (Bechtel Power Corp.), 169 Cal. App. 3d. 235, 215 Cal. Rptr. 316 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1985) (fee award can be based on agency's arbitrary or capricious action, but not merely on 
agency's reversible error); Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 693 
P.2d 1056 (1984) (statute requires court to award fee upon finding that agency acted without 
reasonable basis in fact or law); Van Gordon v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 63 Or. 
App. 561, 666 P.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1983) (basic policies of statute are to deter groundless or 
arbitrary agency action, and "to redress individuals who have borne unfair financial burdens de-
fending against groundless charges or otherwise attempting to right mistakes that agencies should 
never have committed."). 
102. 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986). 
103. Code, supra note 18, Preliminary Statement; Model Rules, supra note 18, Scope, 11 6. 
104. E.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 888 
(1980) (violation of Code is a factor to be considered in malpractice litigation); Lipton v. Boesky, 
110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981) (violation of Code creates presumption of 
malpractice). 
105. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1981); D. 
HORAN & G. SPEI.LMIRE, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE (1987). 
106. On judicial immunity, see infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. Federal law 
clearly gives a prosecutor the same immunity as a judge; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
State law is generally similar, although some state decisions indicate that prosecutors enjoy abso-
lute, quasi-judicial immunity only with regard to their advocacy functions, but they enjoy only 
qualified immunity with regard to their investigative or administrative functions. See Blake v. 
Rupe, 651 P.2d I 096 (Wyo. 1982) (discussing precedents from other states, as well as Restate-
ment Torts Second§ 656); Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840, 851-53 (Colo. 1986) (applying 
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action through civil service or similar channels. 107 
B. Referrals to State Bars or State Prosecutors or Warnings by ALJ 
An administrative law judge who knows that an attorney has en-
gaged in misconduct may refer the matter to state bar authorities for 
disciplinary action108 or to prosecutors for criminal proceedings. 109 An 
ALJ who is faced with an attorney's threatened misconduct may warn 
the attorney that the ALJ will report to the bar or the prosecutor if the 
misconduct takes place. An ALJ may even consider warning the attor-
ney's client about the possible adverse consequences to the client as well 
as to the attorney if the misconduct takes place, although the ALJ must 
generally avoid interfering with the attorney-client relationship. 
If reports to the bar or to prosecutors do not yield speedy resolu-
tion and if mere warnings do not procure compliance, ALJ s may un-
derstandably consider imposing their own measures to procure timely 
compliance with the applicable standards of attorney conduct. Cases 
and rules focus on two types of actions by ALJ s110 to prevent attorneys 
from engaging in misconduct or to penalize those who have committed 
acts of misconduct: (1) exclusion or disqualification of the attorney 
from the specific proceeding, and (2) suspension or disbarment of the 
attorney from future proceedings before the agency. 
federal law); Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. v. Miller, 127 Cal. App. 3d 563, 179 Cal. Rptr. 634 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981),further considered on other grounds 159 Cal. App. 3d 676, 206 Cal. Rptr. 
12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
107. Federal employees are generally governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7514 (1982), but some 
federally-employed attorneys are outside the coverage of that statute, and are not entitled to its 
protection. See, e.g., Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (attorney employed by IRS 
in excepted service is not entitled to civil service protections, despite his status as a preference 
eligible veteran); Morse, A New Stride in Protecting Federal Attorneys, 32 FED. BAR. NEws & J. 
288 (1985). 
I 08. If the ALJ is an attorney, the ALJ is required to report other lawyers' violations, under 
the Code, supra note 18, DRI-103(A), and Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 8.3(a). Further, 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.8.(3), requires a judge to "take or initiate appropriate 
disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may 
become aware." On the question whether the Code of Judicial Conduct applies to ALJs, see infra 
notes 166-79 and accompanying text. See also Rolle v. Nolan, 464 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1983) (anyone, whether a judge or not, who files complaint with bar disciplinary authorities is 
absolutely immune from civil liability). 
I 09. The ALJ should not, however, become involved as movant or party in proceedings seek-
ing a court order compelling an attorney to comply with the ALJ's orders; see supra note 98. 
II 0. For convenient discussion, this part of the article focuses on the actions that can be 
taken by ALJs. The allocation of authority between ALJs and agencies is examined infra, text 
accompanying notes 143-47. 
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C. AL] Enforcement by Exclusion or Disqualification 
The terms "exclusion" and "disqualification" both indicate a re-
fusal, on the part of the ALJ, to allow the attorney to represent a party 
in a pending proceeding. "Exclusion" is generally used when the ALJ's 
refusal is based on the attorney's contemptuous conduct, while "dis-
qualification" is generally used when the cause of the refusal is the 
attorney's conflict of interest. 
1. Exclusion for Contemptuous Conduct 
The federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes the 
ALJ to regulate the course of the proceeding.111 Similar language is 
found in state APAs. 112 These provisions could arguably be cited to 
support the ALJ's power to exclude attorneys for contemptuous con-
duct, but these provisions do not appear to have been used in this 
connection. 
The recently enacted Utah APA, like the federal and state APAs, 
authorizes the ALJ to regulate the course of formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings.113 The Advisory Committee's Comments to the Utah APA 
indicate that this provision should be broadly construed.114 In addition, 
the Utah APA states that the enumeration of the ALJ's powers "does 
not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing."1111 According to the 
Advisory Committee, this provision should be narrowly construed.116 
Any speculation as to the judicial interpretation of these Utah APA 
provisions seems premature. 
Rather than relying on APAs or other general statutes, the courts 
have taken a common-law approach to the powers of ALJs to exclude 
attorneys for contemptuous conduct. In Camp v. Herzog, 117 an attorney 
engaged in contemptuous conduct - an unprovoked assault against op-
posing counsel. The ALJ excluded the attorney from the pending pro-
ceeding. The agency head then conducted a special hearing regarding 
this attorney's misconduct and ordered his suspension from practice 
before the agency for two years. The court reversed the sanction of 
suspension because the agency had not adopted rules for the imposition 
of discipline. The court noted that an agency may exclude an attorney 
111. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982). 
112. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-211(1). 
113. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(1 )(a) (Supp. 1987). 
114. Advisory Committee Comments to Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1987). 
115. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(2) (Supp. 1987). 
116. Advisory Committee Comments to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(2) (Supp. 1987). 
117. 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952). 
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for contemptuous conduct or disqualify an attorney because of conflict 
of interest from prior employment without first adopting rules. The 
court's rationale is that exclusion and disqualification are inherent in 
the agency's power to adjudicate. These measures are not disciplinary 
sanctions, but are means by which the ALJ or agency protects the in-
tegrity of the adjudicative process. On the other hand, an ALJ or 
agency may not impose suspension or other disciplinary sanctions un-
less the agency has first adopted rules implementing its statutory 
authority. 
A similar result was reached in Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. 
NLRBY 8 An ALJ excluded chief counsel for Great Lakes on the 13th 
day of a hearing, pursuant to the agency's rules which provided for 
exclusion for contemptuous conduct. The attorney took an immediate 
interlocutory appeal to the agency head, which denied relief without a 
hearing. The agency stated no grounds for its exclusion of the attorney 
until rendering its final order almost two years later. The agency then 
noted that the attorney had intimidated witnesses, belittled the ability of 
opposing counsel, harassed the ALJ with superfluous objections, and 
ignored the ALJ's admonitions to stop this disruptive conduct. The 
court sustained the validity of the rule but reversed the agency's action 
for lack of support in the record. The court observed that exclusion of 
counsel, if ordered on insufficient grounds, violates the client's right to 
counsel under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The meaning of the term "contemptuous conduct" as the basis for 
excluding counsel is suggested by the fact patterns of the few cases that 
apply it. The term receives further clarification in the rules of some 
federal agencies. 119 Clearly it does not include the entire range of activ-
ities that are evoked by the term "contempt." Rather, it seems limited 
to conduct that seriously disrupts the proceedings. In this sense, the 
power to adjudicate appropriately includes the power to protect the 
proceedings from disruption by excluding "contemptuous" persons, 
whether the tribunal has previously adopted a rule to this effect or not. 
It is noteworthy that lower state courts are allowed to exclude counsel 
on similar grounds, even though these courts generally lack the power 
to impose discipline. 120 
After counsel has been excluded, the ALJ has the obvious duty to 
facilitate a prompt appeal from the order of exclusion and to protect the 
118. 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969). 
119. Selected federal rules are cited supra note 62. See also District No. 1, Pacific Coast 
Dist. Eng.Beneficial Ass'n, 279 N.L.R.B. No. 215, 61 Ad. L.2d 539 (1985) (agency head reversed 
ALJ's order excluding counsel); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 16 N.R.C. 1512,57 Ad. L.2d 1185 
(1982) (agency head denied motion to disqualify agency staff counsel). 
120. Supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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client of the excluded attorney by allowing a reasonable time for substi-
tution of counsel. The ALJ must, at the same time, protect the rights of 
opposing parties to have the merits of the case resolved without undue 
delay. 121 
2. Disqualification for conflict of interest 
In In re Tenure Hearing of Onorevole, 122 a party to a matter 
pending before an ALJ of the New Jersey Office of Administrative 
Law (OAL) moved for disqualification of opposing counsel for conflict 
of interest. The OAL is the state's central panel that assigns ALJs to 
hear cases for various agencies and to render initial decisions which are 
subject to review by the respective agency heads. The statute creating 
the OAL authorizes it to promulgate rules of practice regarding the 
conduct of hearings before its ALJs. Pursuant to this statute, the OAL 
adopted a rule providing for the disqualification of attorneys for conflict 
of interest. 123 The motion to disqualify in Onorevole relied on this 
OAL rule. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute 
and rule, rejecting the argument that they encroached upon the court's 
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. The court noted that the 
ALJ's ruling on the disqualification of counsel was subject to review by 
the agency head under the existing system, but would be subject to re-
view by the director of OAL under a pending proposed amendment; 
either of these avenues of administrative review would be appropriate 
so long as judicial review remained ultimately available. However, 
based on the facts presented in the motion to disqualify counsel in 
Onorevole, the court held that the motion should be denied. 
An agency's power to disqualify counsel, even in the absence of a 
rule, was upheld by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment. 124 A 
party moved to disqualify opposing counsel from appearing in a zoning 
proceeding on the grounds of conflict of interest resulting from coun-
sel's former employment in the District of Columbia Counsel's Office. 
The Board, noting that no statute or rule authorized it to entertain 
121. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA § 4-208, supra note 32, which requires the ALJ, after holding 
a party in default, to "conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudication 
without the participation of the party in default and ... determine all issues in the adjudication, 
including those affecting the defaulting party." Some of the federal rules on exclusion, suspension, 
or disbarment of representatives, supra note 62, infra note 126, include provisions for the subse-
quent protection of parties. 
122. 103 N.J. 548, 511 A.2d 1171 (1986). 
123. N.J. Admin. Code§ 1:1-3.8, cited by the court, 103 N.J. at 553, 511 A.2d at 1175. 
124. 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C. App. 1980). 
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such motions, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to do so and dis-
missed the motion without deciding whether or not counsel had a dis-
qualifying conflict of interest. The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded, holding that the Board had the power 
and the duty to entertain motions to disqualify counsel even though 
there were no statutes or rules on point. According to the court, every 
tribunal that has the power to adjudicate also has the power to disqual-
ify counsel for conflict of interest. This power to disqualify seems to be 
implied, either by the statute that prohibits conflicts of interests by for-
mer public employees or by the requirements of due process. On re-
mand, the Board entertained the motion to disqualify counsel and de-
nied it, holding that counsel did not have a disqualifying conflict of 
interest based on the facts of this case. The court affirmed. 1211 
The above cases on exclusion and disqualification present a coher-
ent doctrine - that any statute conferring adjudicative power upon a 
tribunal includes, by implication, a grant of power to exclude counsel 
for contemptuous conduct and to disqualify counsel for conflict of inter-
est. The agency's power to disqualify counsel for conflict of interest 
receives further implied support from any applicable conflict of interest 
statute or rules. An agency may exclude counsel for contemptuous con-
duct or disqualify counsel for conflict of interest although these powers 
are not expressly conferred by statute or the agency's rules. 
These cases do not clearly explain whether the power to exclude 
or disqualify is merely implied by statute, or is rooted in the due pro-
cess requirement of fundamental fairness to all parties in the agency 
proceeding. If the power is based on due process, two consequences 
may ensue. First, the legislature may be unable to remove this power 
from an agency, even by a clearly written statute attempting to do so. 
Second, agencies may exclude or disqualify counsel on other grounds or 
may take other action than exclusion or disqualification to assure the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings. 
The rules of some federal agencies use the term "disqualify" with 
a different meaning than has been used above. These rules assert the 
power to "disqualify" attorneys from future proceedings before the 
agency as a sanction for past misconduct. 126 This use of the term "dis-
125. 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. App. 1984 ). 
126. For example, representatives (including attorneys) face either suspension for one to five 
years, or disqualification for at least one year and until reinstatement, under three similar groups 
of rules of the Department of Health & Human Services: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1770(a)(2) (1987) (old 
age, survivors, and disability insurance); 20 C.F.R. § 41 0.693(a) (1987) (Black Lung benefits); 20 
C.F.R. § 416.1570(a)(2) (1987) (supplemental security for aged, blind, and disabled). See also 20 
C.F.R. § 702.131 (b), (c) (1987) (Secretary of Labor shall annually post list of representatives, 
including attorneys, who are disqualified from representing parties under Longshoremen's & Har-
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qualify" is confusing, since prevailing usage applies the term "disqual-
ify" only to a measure for the prevention of future improprieties such 
as conflict of interest. A more appropriate term for the disciplinary 
sanctions provided in these rules would be "suspend" since these rules 
provide, in effect, for suspension from practice before the agency as a 
disciplinary sanction for past misconduct. This topic will be discussed 
next. 
D. ALJ Enforcement by Suspension or Disbarment 
Can an ALJ suspend or disbar attorneys as a means of enforcing 
standards of conduct? The question has produced a sharp split between 
state and federal cases. 
1. State suspension or disbarment for misconduct 
In Hustedt v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 127 an attor-
ney, after being warned, failed to appear on time before a Workers 
Compensation Judge. The agency initiated concurrent proceedings for 
discipline and contempt pursuant to statutes conferring both types of 
powers upon the agency. The attorney filed a writ of prohibition in 
court seeking to prevent the agency from proceeding. 
The California Supreme Court invalidated the statutory provision 
which authorized the agency to suspend attorneys as a sanction for mis-
conduct. The court characterized this statute as an impermissible intru-
sion on the "judicial" powers of the state courts to regulate the practice 
of law, and as an undesirable attempt to fragment the state's discipli-
nary system. The court acknowledged the agency's need to control its 
own proceedings but found that the agency could achieve this by using 
other powers. 
One of these other powers was to resort to the courts for the issu-
ance of enforcement orders backed by the courts' contempt power. An-
other was the agency's own contempt power. The court reaffirmed ear-
lier decisions upholding the statutory grant of contempt power to the 
Workers Compensation Appeals Board. 128 
The West Virginia court reached a similar conclusion as to the 
invalidity of statutes allowing agencies to suspend attorneys. In Christie 
bor Workers' Compensation Act); 28 C.F.R. § 2.61(b) (1987) (Parole Commission may disqualify 
representatives, including attorneys, for up to five years). 
127. 30 Cal. 3d 329, 636 P.2d 1139, 178 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1981). See also the companion case 
of Katz v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 30 Cal. 3d 353, 636 P.2d 1153, 178 Cal. Rptr. 
815 (1981). 
128. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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v. West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Authority, 129 an agency sus-
pended an attorney from practicing before it because of the attorney's 
disrespectful conduct. The court granted the attorney relief, holding 
that agencies may adopt rules of procedure but may not suspend attor-
neys from practicing before the agencies, since suspension is a form of 
discipline and the disciplining of attorneys is the exclusive domain of 
the state's highest court. 
2. Federal suspension or disbarment for misconduct 
Federal cases, in contrast to state cases, have upheld statutes au-
thorizing agencies to impose suspension for disciplinary purposes. In 
Polydoroff v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 130 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the action of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in suspending two practition-
ers from practicing before the Commission for six months. The ICC 
found that the practitioners had violated the prohibition against the 
representation of conflicting interests as stated in the Canons of Ethics 
contained in the ICC's rules. 
Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff 131 arose under the rules of the Patent 
and Trademark Office. The PTO suspended an attorney for two years 
for filing misleading information with the PTO and engaging in other 
"inequitable conduct."132 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTO's decision that the attorney had violated the rules, 
but the court reduced the sanction. 
The conflict between state and federal cases on the disciplinary 
power of agencies is understandable. The state cases assert the exclu-
sive power of the state supreme court over the disciplining of attorneys 
while the federal cases acknowledge that Congress may authorize agen-
cies to adopt rules of conduct and to enforce these rules by the agencies' 
own disciplinary processes. 
3. Contempt and other judicial powers distinguished 
This discussion of suspension and disbarment raises the question 
whether agencies may impose other types of sanctions, such as holding 
attorneys in contempt. State courts are divided as to whether statutes 
can confer the contempt power upon administrative agencies. The Vir-
ginia Constitution expressly confers contempt power upon the Corpora-
129. 345 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1986). 
130. 773 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
13 I. 822 F.2d I 053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
132. The court characterized PTO Rule 56, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, as prohibiting inequitable 
conduct. 822 F.2d at 1057. 
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tion Commission.133 In Hustedt, the California court reaffirmed earlier 
decisions upholding a statutory grant of the contempt power to the 
Workers Compensation Appeals Board, partly in view of the special 
status of that agency under the state constitution.13• The same case em-
phasized that disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are quite dif-
ferent from contempt proceedings. The West Virginia court took a dif-
ferent approach in Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Service 
Commission. 136 The court invalidated a statute that delegated the con-
tempt power to the Commission, but upheld another statute that al-
lowed the Commission to impose civil penalties. The implication seems 
to be that contempt is too infamous a sanction to be imposed by a non-
judicial entity, even though that entity could impose a civil penalty for 
the same monetary amount. 
Federal cases have generally held, as did the West Virginia court, 
that the contempt power is a type of judicial power that can be exer-
cised only by the courts/36 but agencies may be authorized by statute to 
impose civil penalties. 137 Polydoroff and Jaskiewicz imply that sus-
pending attorneys from practicing before a federal agency is distin-
guishable from holding an attorney in contempt, and is not an exercise 
of the judicial power. Congress may therefore authorize agencies to sus-
pend attorneys as a disciplinary measure. 
E. ALJ Decision Against Attorney's Client 
In some situations, a client may lose an administrative case on the 
merits as a result of the attorney's violation of applicable standards of 
conduct. The federal APA authorizes an agency to decide the merits of 
a case against a party whose attorney makes improper ex parte commu-
nications during the administrative process. 138 The Act specifies, how-
ever, that the agency should consider the interests of justice before 
reaching such a decision. As a result, it appears that an agency should 
be lenient toward an innocent party but should decide on the merits 
against a party who asked or encouraged the attorney to engage in the 
133. VA. CaNST. art. IX, § 3. 
134. See supra note 127 and infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
135. 296 S.E.2d 887 (W.Va. 1982). Accord, Josam Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 428 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. 
App. 1981) (administrative bodies of Indiana have no contempt power). 
136. See Note, supra note 97. In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd. Inc., 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 
1987) explored the split of authority as to whether Congress could properly confer the contempt 
power upon bankruptcy judges. The court did not resolve the question, finding instead that Con-
gress had not attempted to confer that power. 
137. SCHWARTZ, supra note 79, § 2.25. 
138. Supra note 56. 
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ex parte communication.139 Along similar lines, an agency should be 
lenient toward an innocent party who is subject to default because of 
the attorney's failure to appear, or whose complaint is subject to dis-
missal because of the attorney's abuse of the discovery process. 140 
NLRB v. International Medication Systems, Inc. 141 suggests that 
an agency's power to enforce its standards of conduct by deciding the 
merits against an offending party is subject to limits. The agency pre-
cluded a party from introducing its own evidence because the party had 
failed to respond properly to subpoenas. The U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit held the agency's preclusion order improper since it was 
similar to an exercise of the contempt power which was clearly unavail-
able to the agency. However, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States 
Department of Energy, 142 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected the reasoning of International Medication 
and upheld an agency's power to issue preclusion orders as a sanction 
for a party's recalcitrance in complying with discovery requirements. 
F. Allocation of Enforcement Power - ALJ, Agency, Court 
Assuming that standards of attorney conduct can be enforced in 
some manner at the administrative level, a further question is how the 
enforcement power is allocated among the ALJ, the agency, and the 
court. 
1. Does ALJ or agency head conduct disciplinary hearing? 
Marcus v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board148 involved an 
attorney who allegedly struck opposing counsel during a hearing before 
a referee. Another referee, after a separate hearing on the attorney's 
conduct, found the attorney in contempt and imposed a fine of $100. 
The board affirmed without a hearing. The California court reversed, 
noting that the statute conferred the contempt power upon the board, 
not upon its individual referees. Although most of the board's other 
types of hearings are conducted by referees, subject to the board's ap-
pellate review, the exercise of the contempt power is such a serious 
139. On the sanctions for ex parte communications, see Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
140. On sanctions for abuse of the discovery process, see Chapman v. United States Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n, 788 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1986) (CFTC properly dimissed com-
plaint as sanction under Rule 37(b)). 
141. 640 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
142. 769 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
143. 35 Cal. App. 3d 598, 111 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973),followed in Morton v. 
Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 238 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
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matter that the board itself, or one of its members, must conduct the 
hearing. 
The Marcus precedent may be limited to those rare situations in 
which administrative agencies are allowed to use the contempt power. 
The typical approach is that agencies may not exercise the contempt 
power, but they may exclude attorneys for contemptuous conduct or 
disqualify them for conflict of interest, with or without express provi-
sions in statutes or rules. In the federal system but not the states, agen-
cies may impose suspension or discipline as sanctions if authorized by 
statutes and rules. 
In these settings, one could argue that the power to regulate the 
course of the proceedings, conferred upon the ALJ by the typical state 
APA,144 includes an implied grant of power to exclude or disqualify 
counsel based on whatever process is fair and expedient in the circum-
stances. In contrast, the power to suspend or disbar attorneys seems 
more remote from the immediate need to regulate a specific proceeding, 
and clearly calls for a separate hearing on the disciplinary matter. 
Power to conduct a hearing in this type of situation could appropriately 
be vested, by statute or rule, with either the agency or an ALJ other 
than the one bef<>re whom the misconduct allegedly occurred. If the 
matter is not expressly covered by statute or rule, the disciplinary hear-
ing may appropriately be conducted at the same level as in other mat-
ters. Generally, an ALJ renders an initial or recommended order. 
However, the agency head may select specific cases or categories of 
cases in which it will conduct the hearing. 
2. Administrative review of AL]'s decision 
Three approaches have appeared in the cases and literature re-
garding the possible availability of administrative review of an ALJ's 
decision excluding, disqualifying, suspending or disbarring counsel. 
The first approach is that administrative review should be unavailable. 
This approach is implied from some state APAs which authorize the 
ALJ to rule on questions of procedure. 1411 The theory is that the ALJ is 
law-trained while the agency members are generally not. Therefore the 
ALJ's ruling on procedural matters should bind the agency head as 
well as the parties, subject only to judicial review. 
A second approach, suggested by the Onorevole case, is that the 
144. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-211 (1 ). The equivalent federal APA provi-
sion is 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982). See Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 665 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(FTC has authority to issue protective orders, and has properly delegated this power to its ALJs). 
145. See Levinson, The Pre-Hearing Stage of Contested Cases under the Tennessee Uniform 
Administrative Procedures Act, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. Rt:v. 465, 496-98 (1983). 
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decision of the ALJ should be subject to administrative review but not 
necessarily by the agency head.146 Onorevole arose in a state which has 
a central panel organization of ALJ s. The New Jersey court approved 
administrative review of the ALJ's disqualification order, either by the 
head of the agency for which the ALJ had conducted the hearing or by 
the chief ALJ of the central panel. 
A third approach holds that the agency head has full power to 
review all actions of the ALJ and needs this power in order to carry 
out its statutory mission. This last approach is reflected generally in the 
rules of federal agencies. 147 
3. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review 
In Englishtown Sportswear Ltd. v. Tuttle, 148 a party filed a mo-
tion in federal district court to disqualify opposing counsel from ap-
pearing in a pending matter before the Patent and Trademark Office. 
The court dismissed the motion since the proper forum was the PTO. 
Resort to the court was premature before exhaustion of the administra-
tive remedy. 
Instead of using the principle of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies to decide the above type of case, one could recognize that the dis-
qualification of counsel in administrative proceedings falls within the 
concurrent original jurisdiction of the agency and the court. The origi-
nal jurisdiction of the court is derived from its declaratory and injunc-
tive powers. The issue facing a court, then, is not whether the party 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies but whether the court or the 
agency should exercise primary jurisdiction. 149 The use of the primary 
jurisdiction analysis in this situation confers more discretion on the 
court than is conferred by the principle of exhausting administrative 
remedies. 
146. In a 1982 decision, the New Jersey court invalidated rules of the Office of Administra-
tive Law that limited the power of the agency head to review procedural rulings of ALJs. In re 
Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447 A.2d 151 (1982). But in In re Tenure 
Hearing of Onorevole, 103 N.J. 548, 511 A.2d 1171 (1986), see supra text accompanying note 
122, the same court held that an ALJ's ruling on disqualification of counsel could by rule be made 
reviewable either by the agency head or by the chief ALJ of OAL. 
147. The federal Administrative Procedure Act reflects the assumption that the agency head 
can review the orders of ALJs, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982). 
148. 547 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
149. On the distinction between primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies, see United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), discussed in ScHWARTZ, 
supra note 79, § 8.23. 
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V. PARTIES AND NoN-ATTORNEY REPRESENTATIVES 
Parties sometimes appear in agency proceedings without any rep-
resentative or with a non-attorney representative. The special status of 
parties and non-attorneys requires separate comment as regards admis-
sion, standards of conduct, and enforcement of these standards. 
A. Admission 
A party who is a natural person has a basic right to appear in his 
or her own behalf. uo A corporation or other artificial entity must ap-
pear through a representative. According to the traditional state court 
approach, only a licensed attorney may represent a party. 1111 This tradi-
tion has been relaxed to a limited extent with regard to the representa-
tion of parties in administrative proceedings, but questions still remain 
regarding the permissible role of non-lawyer representatives. 
The Attorney General of Utah rendered a significant opinion on 
this issue in July, 1987. 1112 The question presented was whether non-
attorneys may represent parties in administrative proceedings pursuant 
to three Utah statutes. 1113 After noting that none of these statutes ad-
dressed the issue of non-attorney representation, the Attorney General 
observed that the new Utah APA permits non-attorneys to appear on 
behalf of others in administrative hearings. He reached this conclusion 
on the basis of the APA provision which allows oral and written 
presentations at hearings by non-parties. 1114 This APA provision, ac-
cording to the Attorney General, is a legislatively created exception to 
the pre-existing statute that prohibits non-attorneys from engaging in 
the practice of law .11111 
The Attorney General then raised the basic question under the 
ISO. The party's right to appear is recognized in the federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 5SS(b) (1982), 
and in the 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-203. 
151. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-203(a), Commissioners' Comment. But see New-
some v. Potter, 491 N.Y.S.2d 257 (City Ct. Albany 198S) (since a 1984 statute allows corpora-
tions to appear in Small Claims Court as defendants and to be represented by non-attorney, indi-
vidual defendants in same court may also appear by non-attorney, as matter of equal protection). 
IS2. Op. Atty. Gen. Utah 87-2S (1987). 
1S3. The statutes are the Administrative Determination of Overpayments Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ SS-1Se-1 through -13 (19S3); the Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-4Sb-l through -24 (19S3); and the Child Support Collection Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-4Sd-l 
through -13 (1986 Supp.) 
IS4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(e) (Supp. 1987). 
ISS. The Attorney General's interpretation of the cited Utah APA provision is questionable. 
The Advisory Committee Comments to the APA observe that the provision is patterned after the 
comparable provision in the 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-211(3). This MSAPA provision 
clearly has nothing to do with representation by non-attorneys, since the MSAPA contains another 
section dealing expressly with that issue, namely, 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-203. 
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principle of separation of powers, namely, which branch of state gov-
ernment has the constitutional power to permit non-attorneys to re-
present parties in administrative proceedings. Some state courts have 
asserted their own power to make this determination while other state 
courts have deferred to the legislature. 156 The Utah courts have not yet 
addressed the issue. 
If the Utah Supreme Court asserts its own authority in this field, 
it may follow other state courts that permit limited types of representa-
tion by non-attorneys. The first level of analysis is to ascertain whether 
or not the representation constitutes the practice of law. This depends 
on the type of service rendered and the level of skill required. If, for 
example, the representation requires only the skill and knowledge of an 
ordinary layman, it is not regarded as the practice of law and it can 
properly be performed by a non-attorney. 157 
If, however, the representation is regarded as the practice of law, 
additional analysis is required. The Attorney General has identified 
four situations in which other state courts have allowed non-attorneys 
to practice law by representing parties at administrative proceedings: 
(1) when appeal with a de novo hearing is available/58 (2) when the 
amount in controversy is too small to warrant hiring an attorney/59 (3) 
when the non-lawyer representative is supervised by an attorney;160 or 
( 4) when the non-lawyer representative does not charge a fee for his 
services. 161 The Attorney General's opinion necessarily ends on a note 
of uncertainty, due to the absence of controlling case law in Utah. 
Federal law is quite different. The federal judiciary has no power 
to determine the qualifications of representatives who appear before ad-
ministrative agencies. The matter is controlled by statutes. In particu-
lar, the Agency Practice Act authorizes agencies to establish their own 
admission standards for representatives who are neither attorneys nor 
CPAs. 162 Nonlawyer representatives routinely appear before federal 
agencies. In Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survi-
156. The Opinion rites a number of cases, including Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. 
Uti!. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672, 676, 637 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1981) (court controls); State Bar of 
Michigan v. Galloway, 124 Mich. App. 271, 277, 335 N.W.2d 475, 480 (1983) (court cannot 
control practice before legislatively-created agencies). See also supra note 4. 
157. The Opinion cites State v. Gould, 437 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Ind. 1982). 
158. The Opinion cites Gould, supra note 157. 
159. The Opinion cites Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Employers Unity, 716 P.2d 
460, 463 (Colo. 1986). 
160. The Opinion cites Anamax Mining Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Security, 147 
Ariz. 482, 486, 711 P.2d 621, 624 (Ct. App. 1985). 
161. The Opinion cites In Re Unauthorized Practice of Law, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 
54, 57 (1963). 
162. Supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
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vors, 183 the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that imposes 
a $10 limit on the fee that may be paid to an attorney or other repre-
sentative of a person submitting a claim to the Veterans Administration 
for service-connected death or disability benefits. The Court noted with 
approval that the fee limitation effectively discouraged claimants from 
hiring attorneys. 
B. Standards of Conduct and Their Enforcement 
In the federal system, the conduct of parties and non-attorney rep-
resentatives is regulated by agency rules pursuant to broad grants of 
power in enabling statutes. Typically, the rules prohibiting disruptive 
conduct and the provisions on conflict of interest and unethical conduct 
apply alike to parties, attorneys and non-attorney representatives. 184 
Enforcement is in the hands of the agencies. 
The available state law on standards of conduct of parties and 
non-attorney representatives is sketchy. Obviously the non-attorney 
representative is not governed by the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct because the representa-
tive is not subject to the disciplinary process applicable to bar members. 
The non-attorney representative, however, may be employed to oppose 
a party represented by an attorney, or may compete against attorneys 
for employment by clients. In the interests of basic fairness, it may be 
appropriate for the non-attorney to observe some if not all of the Code 
or Model Rules provisions. 18~ 
VI. ALJ CONDUCT: STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT 
Administrative law judges wield formidable powers over attorneys 
and other participants in the administrative process. The ALJs, in 
turn, are subject to standards of conduct. One purpose served by these 
standards may be to legitimize the ALJ s' exercise of power. 
163. 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
164. For example, the rules cited supra note 126 apply to non-attorney representatives as 
well as to attorneys. In addition, many of the rules cited supra note 62 apply to non-attorneys as 
well as to attorneys. 
165. One of the controversial issues arising when a party is represented by a non-attorney is 
whether communications between the client and the non-attorney representative are privileged. 
See, e.g., Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 25, 619 P.2d 1036 
(1980) (court allows non-attorneys to represent parties in some types of personnel cases, but ob-
serves that communications will not be privileged); Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan, 33 
Cal. 3d 766, 661 P.2d 1073, 190 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983) (California statute implementing federal 
AFDC regulations provides for lay representation - court holds that this implies the privileged 
nature of communications). 
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A. Code of judicial Conduct - Is It Applicable to AL]s? 
The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct in 1972. Most state supreme courts have promulgated the 
Code as statewide rules of court166 while the Judicial Conference of the 
United States has approved a modified version of the Code for federal 
judges.167 
The Code does not expressly state whether or not it applies to 
administrative law judges, but it contains the following language under 
the heading "Compliance:" 
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial sys-
tem performing judicial functions, including an officer such as a refe-
ree in bankruptcy, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, 
is a judge for the purpose of this Code. All judges should comply with 
this Code except as provided below!68 
1. ABA opinion - Code applies to AL]s 
In Informal Opinion No. 86-1522, the Ethics Committee of the 
ABA expressed the view that federal ALJ s are judges falling within the 
above definition; accordingly, they are covered by the Code.169 The 
ABA committee's opinion obviously is not binding. While some ALJs 
may voluntarily conform to the Code out of respect for the committee, 
others may wait to see whether the Code will be given the force of law 
as applied to ALJs. But which governmental entity is authorized to 
make the Code applicable to ALJ s ? 
The state supreme courts may have neither the inclination nor the 
jurisdiction to declare that their Codes of Judicial Conduct apply to 
ALJ s located in the executive branch of government. Statutes, agency 
rules, and the rules of chief ALJ s of central panels seem to be the 
available mechanisms for imposing the Code upon ALJ s. The legisla-
tures, agencies, and chief ALJ s may, in turn, be encouraged to adopt 
the Code if courts allow ALJ s who are governed by the Code to exer-
cise more powers than ALJ s who are not. 
166. Thode, Code of judicial Conduct - The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH 
L. Rt:v. 395. 
167. The Judicial Conference adopted its own version of the Code of Judicial Conduct in 
1973, and has subsequently made some amendments. See 69 F.R.D. 273 (1975). The Judicial 
Conference serves in an advisory capacity in various matters, including judicial discipline. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 331, 372(c) (1982). 
168. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, "Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct." 
169. ABA Inf. Op. 86-1522 (1986). 
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2. Statutes or agency rules 
Only a few instances have been found in which statutes or rules 
have imposed the Code of Judicial Conduct upon ALJs. Workers Com-
pensation Judges (WCJs) of the California Workers Compensation 
Appeals Board are required, by statute, to conform to the state's Code 
of Judicial Conduct.170 These WCJs, also by statute, have the contempt 
power discussed earlier. 171 The combination of the two statutes - one 
granting the contempt power, the other imposing the Code of Judicial 
Conduct on the very same WCJs - implies a legislative determination 
that the contempt power may be wielded legitimately only by individu-
als who are subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. ALJ s in the New 
Jersey central panel are subject to rules promulgated by the chief ALJ, 
incorporating the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as other provi-
sions.172 The mayoral executive order creating the New York City cen-
tral panel requires all ALJs to conform to the Code of Judicial 
Conduct. 173 
3. Court decisions 
In upholding the New Jersey ALJs' power to disqualify counsel 
in the Onorevole case, the New Jersey court mentioned that these 
ALJ s were governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct. 174 In context, it 
appears that the court took into account the fact that ALJs are gov-
erned by the Code, and concluded that ALJs may properly exercise the 
power to disqualify counsel in adjudicative proceedings. If this interpre-
tation of Onorevole is correct, it indicates that the New Jersey court, 
like the California legislature, ties the type of power exercisable by an 
ALJ to the type of control imposed on the same ALJ. This approach 
suggests that the Code - or an equivalent compilation of judicial stan-
dards - not only imposes burdens upon those governed by it, but also 
confers added legitimacy upon them, thereby extending the range of 
powers they may properly exercise. 
A Colorado appellate court recently made a strong statement about 
the applicability of the Code of Judicial Conduct to ALJs. In Wells v. 
Del Norte School District C-7, 1711 in a hearing on a public school 
170. Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 153 Cal. App. 3d 965, 
200 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), citing Cal. Labor Code§ 123.6. 
171. Supra notes 134, 143 and accompanying text. 
172. Infra note 174. 
173. City of New York, Executive Order No. 32 Qui. 25, 1979) (on file at BYU Journal of 
Public Law). 
174. In re Tenure of Hearing of Onorevole, 103 N.J. 548, 552, 511 A.2d 1171, 1175 (1986). 
175. No. 85CA0126 (Slip. Op., Colo. App., Oct. 15, 1987, in 1987 Cow. LAw. 2221). I am 
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teacher's dismissal case, the hearing officer called a lunch recess during 
the testimony of a witness. The hearing officer went to a nearby restau-
rant for lunch, and sat down to eat at the table where the witness and 
counsel for the school board were eating. When the hearing resumed, 
the hearing officer reported this lunch-time incident. He explained that 
no other seats had been available at the restaurant, and that before 
taking his seat he had indicated he would not discuss the case. No evi-
dence of any inappropriate discussion existed; however, the teacher and 
others involved in the hearing saw the hearing officer engaging in con-
versation with the witness during lunch. The hearing officer decided 
against the teacher, and she appealed. 
The court reversed and remanded for a new hearing before a dif-
ferent hearing officer. The court found no violation of due process, but 
did find a blatant appearance of impropriety in violation of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. "When administrative proceedings are quasi-judi-
cial," the court stated, "agency officials should be treated as the 
equivalent of judges."176 
In this case, the improper off-the-bench conduct was clearly re-
lated to the pending adjudicative proceeding, and created an appearance 
that the hearing officer's decision in that proceeding might be tainted 
by his ex parte contacts at the restaurant. The court does not indicate 
whether it would grant relief if the off-the-bench misconduct was less 
directly related to a pending proceeding before the hearing officer. 
Other courts have made only passing references to the relationship be-
tween ALJs and the Code of Judicial Conduct. 177 
B. Selected Provisions of the Code of judicial Conduct 
The Code of Judicial Conduct imposes numerous controls on 
judges. It prohibits them from serving as officers or directors of busi-
ness corporations178 (but Utah has not included this prohibition in its 
Code), from engaging in various political activities/79 and from com-
indebted to Judith F. Schulman, a Colorado ALJ, for bringing this case to my attention at the 
seminar. The summary of the case in the accompanying text is similar to a summary I prepared 
for "Administrative Law News," a publication of the ABA Section of Administrative Law. 
176. 1987 Cow. LAW. at 2222. 
177. E.g., Michigan Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Personnel Director, 156 Mich. App. 
388, 402 N.W.2d 19 (1986) (Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to ALJs); Pinkney v. 
Indep. School Dist. No. 691, 366 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (hearing examiners should 
conduct themselves in accordance with Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct); State Div. of 
Human Rights v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 59 A.D.2d 1054, 399 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 
1977). 
178. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5.C(2). 
179. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7. 
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mitting indiscretions in their personal lives. 180 Two areas require spe-
cial discussion in context of applying the Code to ALJs - the prohibi-
tion against the practice of law and the standards for judicial 
disqualification. 
1. Practice of law 
The Code prohibits full-time judges from practicing law. 181 This 
provision was the specific issue in ABA Informal Opinion No. 86-
1522.182 Having concluded that the Code applies to ALJs, the ABA 
committee opined that an ALJ may not serve as counsel for another 
ALJ in an administrative hearing since such service would constitute 
the practice of law in violation of the Code. 
The Code allows a part-time judge to practice law, but not "in the 
court on which he serves or in any court subject to the appellate juris-
diction of the court on which he serves."183 As applied to the adminis-
trative setting, this provision prohibits an individual from serving part-
time as an ALJ and part-time as counsel appearing in cases before the 
same agency. Such an alternation of roles would also violate the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act which prohibits ALJs from being assigned 
any duties incompatible with their decisional responsibilities. 18' 
2. Disqualification 
The Code of Judicial Conduct contains elaborate standards for the 
disqualification of a judge - not only for actual bias but also for nu-
merous other reasons. 1811 The Model State Administrative Procedure 
Act incorporates, by reference, the disqualification standards applicable 
to judges in the state by providing that an ALJ may be disqualified on 
any grounds for which a judge is disqualified. 186 
In states that have not enacted similar statutes, courts must decide 
whether to use the Code's standards or others in determining disputes 
about the disqualification of ALJs from agency proceedings. The dif-
180. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2. See Lubet, judicial Impropriety: Love, 
Friendship, Free Speech, and Other Intemperate Conduct, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 379. 
181. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5.F. 
182. Supra note 169. 
183. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, "Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct" 
(A)(l), (2). 
184. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). 
185. For example, ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.C. requires disqualification of a 
judge on the basis of certain family relationships between the judge and a party or attorney for a 
party, whether or not these relationships cause any actual bias. The underlying policy is to pre-
vent even the appearance of impropriety. 
186. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-202(b). 
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ference between the Code and other standards is illustrated by New 
York State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dis-
trict Council 82 v. New York State Public Employees Relations 
Board. 187 The court held that the Code was inapplicable to the Board's 
ALJs. Instead of applying the across-the-board provisions of the Code, 
the court applied due process requirements on a case-by-case basis. The 
distinction made a difference in the outcome of this case; the court held 
that disqualification was not required by due process but would have 
been if the Code of Judicial Conduct had governed. 
C. Other Standards of ALJ Conduct - Independence and 
Impartiality 
ALJs are subject to standards of conduct derived from various 
other sources. If the Code of Judicial Conduct applies, its standards 
overlap with some of those derived from other sources. Most fundamen-
tally, ALJ s must assure the due process rights of parties appearing 
before them. One aspect of due process is the requirement of an unbi-
ased decisionmaker. The Code of Judicial Conduct and the case law 
regarding due process overlap partially on this issue although, as illus-
trated by the New York State Inspection decision,188 the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct calls for disqualification even in situations where due pro-
cess does not. 
A related aspect of due process is the need for the ALJ to exercise 
decisional independence. Numerous suits have been brought in the fed-
eral courts by parties seeking relief from the threat to ALJ s' indepen-
dence posed by the Social Security Administration's (SSA) system for 
selective administrative review of ALJs' decisions. This system, known 
generally as the Bellmon system, provided for the SSA appeals council 
to review, on its own motion, a relatively high percentage of the deci-
sions rendered by ALJs whose previous decisions tended to favor claim-
ants.189 The courts, with virtual unanimity, have held the system inva-
lid as an interference with the decisional impartiality of ALJ s. 
Recently, in Barry v. Bowen, 190 the court observed: "Administrative 
decisionmakers do not bear all the badges of independence that charac-
187. 629 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). But see State Div. of Human Rights v. Merchants 
Mutual Ins. Co., 59 A.D.2d 1054, 399 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1977) Oudiciary Law on dis-
qualification does not apply to quasi-judicial administrative officers, but court looks to such law). 
188. Supra note 187. 
189. The system was based on the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, P.L. 96-
265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441,456 (1980), codified as note to 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982), which author-
ized the Secretary to establish a system for selective appellate review of the decisions of ALJ s. 
190. 825 F.2d 1324 {9th Cir. 1987). 
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terize an Article III judge, but they are held to the same standard of 
impartial decisionmaking. "191 
The need for decisional independence must be balanced with the 
ALJ's obligation to conform to reasonable administrative requirements 
of the employing agency or central panel system. Two recent cases have 
addressed the issue. 
In Deretich v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 192 an ALJ who 
had been discharged from employment by the Minnesota central panel 
brought a civil rights action in federal court. The federal court denied 
relief, holding that the discharge was based on valid grounds including 
the ALJ's violation of rules on conflict of interests, his utilization of a 
leave of absence for purposes different from those for which it had been 
granted, and his refusal to cease his association with a law firm as 
counsel in hearings of the type he regularly conducted as a judge. 
In Lowry v. State, Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, 193 an 
ALJ refused to allow non-attorneys to represent parties although the 
Board directed him to do so. The Board suspended the ALJ for insub-
ordination. The court reversed, noting that the ALJ believed that com-
pliance with the Board's directive would constitute assisting the unau-
thorized practice of law in violation of criminal statutes and the Code 
of Professional Responsibility. The court did not rule on the merits of 
the Board's directive. By refraining from ruling on this issue, the court 
implied that the ALJ's concerns as to its illegality were an adequate 
basis for his refusal to comply. 
If ALJs are members of the bar, they are subject not only to judi-
cial-type standards but also to the standards of conduct applicable to 
attorneys. Nonlawyer ALJs, while not subject to attorney standards, 
should be governed by any other standards applicable to lawyer-ALJs, 
not only out of fairness to the parties but also to establish the legiti-
macy of the exercise of ALJ s' powers by nonlawyers. 194 In a system in 
which ALJs are governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct, non-lawyer 
ALJs as well as lawyer-ALJs should comply with the Code. 
191. 825 F.2d at 1330. 
192. 798 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1986). 
193. 102 Wash.2d 58, 684 P.2d 678 (1984). 
194. Due process does not require an ALJ to be a lawyer. This result is implied by 
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) and by the substantial literature on nonlawyer 
judges. See D. PROVINE, JuDGING CREDENTIALS: NoNLAWYER JuDGES AND THE POI.ITICS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM (1986); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976); Lecates v. Justice of the Peace 
Court, 637 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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D. Enforcing Standards of ALJ Conduct 
Standards of ALJ conduct are enforceable in a variety of ways. A 
biased ALJ is subject to disqualification under the APA or other 
law. 19& A decision resulting from an ALJ's misconduct is subject to re-
versal on administrative or judicial review .196 
ALJs are subject to discipline by agencies, civil service boards, or 
the chief ALJ s of central panels as applicable in the circumstances.197 
Special care must be taken to prevent the threat of discipline from un-
duly impairing an ALJ's decisional independence. ALJs who are attor-
neys are subject to bar disciplinary process for misconduct, including 
that committed while serving as ALJ. 198 
Tort law is not an effective means of enforcing standards of ALJ 
conduct since full-time ALJs enjoy absolute immunity from civil liabil-
ity arising under federal law199 while administrative officials who serve 
occasionally as hearing officers enjoy only qualified immunity.200 State 
law on immunity of ALJs appears to be similar to federal law. 201 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The law of professional responsibility in the states is distinguisha-
ble from its federal counterpart because of the significant role played by 
the state supreme courts. No federal court performs an equivalent 
function. 
In the states, the supreme courts control admission to the practice 
195. Federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 4-202(b). 
196. The party seeking review must show that the ALJ's misconduct caused prejudice. See 
federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 32, § 5-116(c). 
197. Discipline of federal ALJs is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982). On discipline of state 
ALJs in the central panel systems, see RICH & BRUCAR, supra note 81, at 47-49. 
198. On discipline of judges as lawyers see, e.g., In re Hasler, 447 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1969); 
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Haworth, 593 P.2d 765 (Okl. 1979). 
199. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
200. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 197 (1985). 
201. Absolute immunity was conferred upon administrative decision-makers in Loran v. Is-
zler, 373 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1985) (hearing officer); State v. Mason, 724 P.2d 1289 (Colo. 1986) 
(parole board member); Tarter v. State, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 503 N.E.2d 84 (1986) 
(parole board member); Tulia v. Com., State Horse Racing Comm'n, 79 Pa. Commw. 305, 470 
A.2d 645 (Commw. Ct. 1984) (racing commission member); Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 
339 S.E.2d 181 (1986) (corrections employees who decided to release juvenile delinquent); Ray-
burn v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash. App. 163, 709 P.2d 399 (1985) (police pension board member). 
See also In re Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355 (1979) (members of Industrial Board immune 
from criminal prosecution for allowing motel to remain in business in unsafe building, leading to 
loss of lives in fire, where no corruption or bad faith was alleged). But see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. 
of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (parole board members enjoy only 
qualified immunity). 
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of law on a centralized basis.202 A license to practice law includes the 
privilege of practicing before all tribunals of the state including admin-
istrative agencies. In most states the supreme courts themselves promul-
gate statewide standards of attorney conduct. In a few states, some of 
the basic standards are promulgated by statute, and additional details 
are provided by bar association rules which in turn are subject to the 
influence of the courts. 
Each administrative agency may adopt its own rules of practice 
within the framework established by the statutes that create the agency 
and define its mission. The agency's rules are incorporated, by refer-
ence, in the state's Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct.203 As a matter of policy, it appears desirable 
for agencies to exercise restraint in adopting rules of practice so that 
their rules do not create needless diversity or complexity. 
Each agency may exclude attorneys for contemptuous conduct 
tending to disrupt the proceedings.204 If this power is not expressly con-
ferred by statute, it is implied in the grant of power to adjudicate. This 
power is not, however, absolutely essential since the ALJ has an alter-
native means of protecting the integrity of the proceedings - the ALJ 
may continue the proceedings and refer the matter to the state courts or 
bar authorities. If experience shows that the option of continue-and-
report is generally impractical, the ALJ should be excused from using 
this option and should be allowed, instead, to use the only remaining 
practical option - excluding attorneys who engage in contemptuous 
conduct. The legislature may, however, expressly prohibit the ALJ 
from exercising the power to exclude. In that situation, the only option 
available to an ALJ faced with contemptuous counsel is to continue the 
proceedings and refer the matter to state courts or bar authorities, even 
though this option may be impractical. 
An ALJ has the additional implied power to disqualify counsel 
from appearing in a particular proceeding where the grounds for dis-
qualification are provided by statute, as in the case of the "revolving 
door" between public and private employment.2011 One explanation is 
that the statute which expresses the grounds for disqualification should 
be read in pari materia with the statute that confers the power to adju-
dicate. The combined effect of both statutes is to empower the ALJ to 
202. Supra notes 2-4. 
203. Supra note 19; see also supra notes 87-88. 
204. See supra notes 117-20 (federal cases on exclusion of counsel) and notes 122-25 (state 
cases on disqualification of counsel) which tend to support the accompanying text, although no 
state cases have been found that specifically uphold the power of an ALJ to exclude counsel for 
contemptuous conduct. 
205. Supra notes 122-25. 
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disqualify counsel where the statutory grounds apply. If, however, the 
statute expressly prohibits the ALJ from disqualifying counsel, the 
ALJ's only option is to continue and report. 
Another explanation of the ALJ's power to disqualify counsel is 
that the statutory grant of power to adjudicate implies that the ALJ 
may do whatever is practically required to protect the integrity of the 
proceedings including, but not limited to, the exclusion of counsel for 
contemptuous conduct. This explanation could support the power of the 
ALJ to disqualify counsel, not only where the grounds are provided by 
statute, but in other situations as well. 
Assume, for example, that a motion is filed with an ALJ to dis-
qualify counsel from representing the licensee in a license revocation 
proceeding on the grounds that counsel is likely to be a necessary wit-
ness in the same proceeding. This situation would generally require 
disqualification under the Code206 or the Model Rules,207 but let us 
assume that no statute or agency rule covers it. What options are avail-
able to the ALJ? 
The ALJ may refuse to entertain the motion and may proceed 
with the hearing. This option is clearly unsatisfactory since the ALJ, 
without having determined the merits of the movant's position, would 
allow counsel to engage in an alleged violation of the Code or Model 
Rules. The ALJ may, instead, refuse to entertain the motion, refer the 
matter to an appropriate court or bar tribunal, and continue the admin-
istrative hearing pending determination of the disqualification motion. 
This option is clearly proper but it causes obvious delay and for that 
reason is probably impractical in the typical situation. Finally, the ALJ 
may entertain and decide the motion, subject to administrative and judi-
cial review on an interlocutory or final basis in the same manner as 
would apply to any other procedural ruling. This option is, on balance, 
the most attractive and is supportable by the ALJ's general statutory 
power to regulate the course of the proceedings. This option could be 
precluded by statute because it is not essential for due process purposes. 
If a statute precluded this option, the ALJ would have to exercise the 
second option, continue-and-refer. 
State law does not allow ALJ s or agencies to suspend or disbar 
attorneys. 208 Even without such powers, ALJs are able to protect the 
integrity of the proceedings without unnecessary delay through exclu-
sion and disqualification of counsel, while avoiding encroachment on 
206. Code, supra note 18, DR 5-102. 
207. Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 3.7. 
208. Supra notes 127-29. 
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the general authority of the state supreme courts to exercise disciplinary 
power on a statewide basis. 
As regards non-attorney representatives, the states have been una-
ble to reach consensus.209 Some state supreme courts have themselves 
determined the circumstances, if any, in which non-attorneys may re-
present parties before agencies while other courts have deferred to the 
legislature on this issue. The extent of non-attorney practice before 
agencies seems to vary considerably from one state to another. 
Some courts, in determining whether non-attorneys may practice 
before agencies, have made incidental statements about the conduct re-
quired of such representatives.210 With this exception, state supreme 
courts generally lack jurisdiction to prescribe standards of conduct for 
non-attorneys. Standards must therefore be set by the legislature or the 
agency. 
It seems desirable to establish uniform, statewide standards for 
non-attorney representatives and to harmonize these standards, as far 
as possible, with those governing attorneys. Any significant difference 
between the standards governing attorneys and those governing non-
attorneys could create a serious risk of unfairness in a proceeding 
where one party is represented by an attorney and the other by a non-
attorney. For example, the rules which prohibit attorneys from taking 
frivolous positions in litigation211 or offering false evidence212 should be 
made applicable to non-attorneys; otherwise, a party represented by an 
attorney would risk a serious disadvantage against an opposing party 
represented by a non-attorney. 
These considerations require harmonization of attorney and non-
attorney standards only with regard to matters that are directly related 
to the fair conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. In contrast, it ap-
pears unnecessary to subject non-attorneys to the same rules as attor-
neys on matters that do not directly relate to the fair conduct of the 
proceeding. Differences in the rules on solicitation applicable to attor-
neys213 and to non-attorneys, for example, may have an impact on the 
competition for obtaining clients by these two categories of practition-
ers, but are unlikely to create a risk of unfairness to the parties or to 
have any other impact on the conduct of the representation. Accord-
ingly, harmonization of attorney standards with non-attorney standards 
on solicitation seems unnecessary. 
209. Supra notes 156-61. 
210. Supra notes 157-61, 165. 
211. Code, supra note 18, DR 7-102(A)(1), (2); Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 3.1. 
212. Code, supra note 18, DR 7-102(A)(4); Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 3.3. 
213. Code, supra note 18, DR 2-103(A), DR 2-104; Model Rules, supra note 18, Rule 7.3. 
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Harmonization of standards of conduct of attorneys and non-attor-
neys will not eliminate the risk of unfairness unless the enforcement of 
these standards is also harmonized. This creates obvious difficulties 
since the enforcement of standards of attorney conduct is in the hands 
of the courts and their supporting tribunals, while enforcement of stan-
dards of non-attorney conduct is generally in the hands of the agencies 
and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts (except in the exercise of lim-
ited judicial review of agency action). A narrow range of judicial super-
vision may exist where a court, having determined the limits within 
which non-attorneys may practice before agencies, attempts to monitor 
compliance with these limits. 
Harmonization of enforcement may be achieved by aligning the 
agency's enforcement measures against non-attorneys with the court's 
enforcement measures against attorneys. For example, if the courts rou-
tinely dismiss complaints alleging that attorneys have taken frivolous 
positions in litigation, the agency should adopt a similar attitude when 
faced with similar complaints against non-attorneys. 
Standards of ALJ conduct are generally promulgated by statute, 
agency rule, or central panel rule. 214 Courts may intervene to guarantee 
due process, especially where the issue is whether an ALJ should be 
disqualified for bias. The ABA committee has opined that the Code of 
Judicial Conduct applies to ALJs.2111 A few court decisions have taken 
a similar view, at least with regard to ALJ conduct that relates directly 
to the fairness of a particular proceeding.216 While a court can declare 
a specific provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct applicable for the 
benefit of a party in a particular case, the courts have not imposed the 
Code upon ALJs generally. An argument could be made that the due 
process rights of the parties require a legitimate system of adjudication, 
which in turn requires all ALJs to be governed by a coherent body of 
rules, such as the Code of Judicial Conduct. The courts have not 
adopted this argument. They tend, instead, to defer to the legislature, 
agency, or central panel director as the source of standards to govern 
ALJs. 
Attorney ALJs are governed by bar standards in addition to 
whatever standards may be imposed on ALJs with regard to their sta-
tus as adjudicators. Thus attorney ALJs are subject to administrative 
discipline for violating any statutory or regulatory standards, and to bar 
discipline for violating standards that apply to them as attorneys. If the 
statutory or regulatory standards include or even approximate the Code 
214. Supra text following note 169. 
215. Supra note 169. 
216. Supra notes 174-77. 
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of Judicial Conduct, these standards are likely to be sufficient to guar-
antee the fairness of the proceedings and the bar standards applicable 
to ALJ s as attorneys are unlikely to be invoked. If, on the other hand, 
the statutory or regulatory standards do not include or approximate the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, the bar standards may provide a significant 
back-up guarantee of fairness. The general theory of harmonization 
suggests that non-attorney ALJ s be governed by standards similar to 
those that govern attorneys in matters that relate directly to the fairness 
of the proceedings, and that enforcement against non-attorney ALJs be 
harmonized with enforcement against attorney ALJ s. 
In the absence of any significant governing role by the federal 
courts, practice before federal agencies is governed by statutes and 
agency rules. In one vital area - the admission of attorneys to practice 
before agencies - federal law defers almost completely to state law. 
The Agency Practice Act allows attorneys licensed in any state to prac-
tice before virtually all federal agencies, but the Act reserves power to 
federal agencies to impose discipline and to prevent conflicts of interest 
resulting from violation of "revolving door" statutes. 217 Thus the Act 
expresses a federal policy of deferring to the states with regard to the 
admission of attorneys but not with regard to discipline or 
disqualification. 
Federal standards of attorney conduct are established by statute or 
rule. Agencies may develop non-rule standards only with regard to ex-
clusion for contemptuous conduct, or disqualification for violation of 
"revolving door" statutes. 218 
Two major issues arise regarding the substantive content of federal 
standards established by statute or rule - whether these standards may 
extend to attorney conduct occurring outside the presence of the agency 
and whether these standards may differ from corresponding provisions 
of state law. Federal case law has given affirmative answers to each 
question219 but troublesome policy issues persist as to the impact of 
these cases on the relationship between federal and state regulation. 
If the system of attorney discipline at the state level is functioning 
effectively, one may argue that the state bar authorities should be al-
lowed to exercise primary jurisdiction in adopting and enforcing stan-
dards of attorney conduct. Federal statutes and rules should reflect ap-
propriate restraint in order to avoid unnecessary interference with state 
law. Thus the appropriate domain of regulation by federal agencies 
should be the same as that of state agencies - dealing with contemptu-
217. Supra notes 10-17. 
218. Supra notes 117-18, 130-31. 
219. Supra notes 64-66, and see supra notes 77-78. 
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ous conduct and disqualification of counsel in situations where the pro-
cedural rights of the parties cannot be practically protected by continu-
ing the proceedings and reporting to state bar authorities. Under this 
theory, federal agencies should refrain from exercising their power to 
regulate attorney conduct outside the presence of the agency, and 
should regulate conduct in the presence of the agency in a manner that 
harmonizes as much as feasible with the corresponding state law. It 
would seem unnecessary for federal agencies to exercise the power to 
suspend or disbar attorneys just as it seems unnecessary for state agen-
cies to exercise these powers. Further, where federal agencies enforce 
their regulations of attorney conduct, they should harmonize their en-
forcement policies with those of the state. 
The difficulty is that federal agencies may regard state bar regula-
tion as not sufficiently effective. In this setting, federal agencies may 
determine that they must exercise primary jurisdiction in adopting and 
enforcing standards of attorney conduct. Federal agencies, under this 
approach, may regulate conduct occurring outside the presence of the 
agency, may impose standards of conduct that differ from state rules on 
the same topic, and may impose the sanctions of suspension and disbar-
ment. This is a very different view of agency powers than that taken by 
state agencies. 
The dispositive factor appears to be the federal agency's perception 
of the effectiveness of state regulation of attorney conduct. This is not a 
matter that a reviewing court is likely to evaluate. Even if a court could 
make a finding as to the effectiveness of state regulation, the court 
might conclude that a federal agency exercises non-reviewable discre-
tion in deciding whether to use its statutory enforcement power or to 
defer to the primary jurisdiction of state bar authorities. 
The task of the federal agency will be further complicated if the 
agency determines that state bar enforcement is effective in one state 
but not in another. The agency may then have to consider deferring to 
state bar authorities in the first state but not in the second. This ap-
pears to be an appropriate manifestation of federalism, giving the max-
imum feasible deference to the states. 
There is less overlap between federal and state law on the regula-
tion of non-attorneys. Federal admission standards are established by 
statute and rule with no deference to the states. To a considerable ex-
tent, federal standards of non-attorney conduct have been harmonized 
with federal standards of attorney conduct. 220 The states appear to be 
in the early stages of formulating standards of non-attorney conduct.221 
220. Supra note 164. 
221. Supra notes 156-61, 165. 
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As indicated above, reasonable harmonization of these standards with 
the standards of attorney conduct seems desirable, although the state 
agencies handle enforcement against non-attorneys while the state 
courts generally handle enforcement against attorneys. 
Federal ALJs, like their state counterparts, are regulated by stat-
ute and agency rule. Since the central panel approach has not yet been 
adopted by the federal government, federal ALJs are not subject to cen-
tral panel rules of conduct. Questions of ALJ s' decisional independence 
have been more vigorously litigated in the federal courts than in the 
states.222 Federal attorney-ALJs, like their state counterparts, are sub-
ject to discipline by state bar authorities. 
The Code of Judicial Conduct has not been adopted for federal 
ALJs. Their exercise of the power to decide cases and to discipline 
attorneys - and indeed their claim to the title "Judge" - would be on 
stronger ground if they were governed by the Code or an equivalent set 
of standards. 
The most obvious contrast is between the role of the state supreme 
courts in regulating conduct before state agencies and the lack of any 
equivalent judicial control at the federal level. Does this structural dif-
ference lead to any difference in the conduct of those who practice 
before state and federal agencies? Empirical evidence is lacking, al-
though it could possibly be obtained by distributing a questionnaire to 
state and federal ALJ s asking about the frequency of misconduct by 
attorneys and other representatives and about the number of complaints 
referred to state bar authorities. 
The diverse views of separation of powers at the state and federal 
levels are reflected in the different allocations of regulatory jurisdiction 
explored earlier in this article. In the arena of practice, there appear to 
be three major distinctions between the state and federal levels. First, 
practice by non-attorneys has received more formal and widespread 
recognition before federal than state agencies; second, federal agencies 
make less use of non-attorney ALJs than do state agencies; and third, 
some federal agencies - notably the SEC and the IRS - are fairly 
aggressive in bringing enforcement proceedings against attorneys and 
other representatives, including actions for misconduct allegedly occur-
ring outside the presence of the agency. I see no indication of similar 
enforcement efforts by state agencies or bar authorities. If indeed state 
authorities have failed to match the enforcement efforts of these federal 
agencies, the lack of state enforcement offers some justification for con-
tinued enforcement by federal agencies. 
222. Supra notes 189-93. 
